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ABSTRACT
The world is guaranteed a certain level of climate change due to the emissions
already released into the atmosphere. Therefore, adaptation to climate change is
necessary. Increases in diarrheal disease and malnutrition due to climate change are
analyzed for Bangladesh. Relative risks determined by the World Health Organization,
estimates obtained from agricultural models, and migration estimates are utilized to
determine the costs associated with each of these diseases, as well as reductions in rice
production and increases in urban migration. It is found that climate change will create
additional costs for treating each of these diseases that equal .05% of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), losses to rice production equal to 1.5705% of GDP, and increases in
urban migration of 4.2%. Utilizing a vulnerability framework, adaptation policies are
recommended that reduce societal vulnerability to these impacts.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
“Economic vulnerability due to reduction of controls on the movement of finance and
goods has introduced a new era of economic volatility. Low, unstable prices destroy
earnings and the ability of poor, commodity-dependent countries—already constrained
by the burden of debt and structural adjustment policies—to invest in development.
Financial volatility wrecks the livelihoods of millions. But of all the new threats, it is the
many dimensions of global warming that are least analyzed for their impacts on efforts to
improve well being1.”
Vulnerability is an intuitively simple concept, and yet inherently difficult to
define for policy making purposes. It can be so all encompassing that it proves useless or
so narrowly defined as to miss many of the most relevant issues. Striking a balance
between these two extremes is of utmost importance. Global vulnerability increasingly
reflects the deep social and economic divisions within and between societies
differentiating those who have, from those who don‟t. In many nations within the
developing world a small percentage of the population benefits from the majority of the
wealth created. Outside of this sliver of population, the vast majority of the world‟s poor
carve out an existence in an increasingly hostile environment that lacks even the most
basic public goods such as health care or education.
Social and economic vulnerability is currently being driven by a set of global
trends that further exacerbates the problems of the poor. Macroeconomic changes have
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created both rural and urban instability that has resulted in rising levels of inequality and
poverty in the developing world. This trend has resulted in rapid urbanization as the rural
poor seek economic opportunity and flee unsustainable livelihoods brought about by
economic and environmental changes. In addition, rapid unplanned urbanization has
increased inequality and overall poverty as migrants are forced to live on the fringes of
undeveloped societies that offer little opportunity for the generation of livelihoods or
income. The result is urban squalor and destitution of monumental proportions. Many
within the international community have sought to rectify this assault on human dignity.
Perhaps the most well known codification of their efforts can be found in the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) which specifically address the plight of the poor and
destitute in developing countries around the world. While there has been much laudable
success at achieving the eight goals and their accompanying targets, much work has yet
to be done if lives are to be genuinely improved.
There is, however, a dark cloud looming on the horizon that threatens to not only
halt, but perhaps irrevocably reverse, the progress made towards these noble goals. That
threat is global climate change. Not only is this threat very real, its effects are already
being felt around the world. In fact, communities from such diverse locales as Shishmaref
Alaska, to the Cartaret Islands of Papua New Guinea, have already been forced to flee the
encroaching effects of rising sea levels, high winds and storm surges2. These “climate
canaries” have sent a signal that the developing world can not afford to ignore.
Unfortunately, despite the best efforts of the global community in mitigating greenhouse
gas emissions, we are locked into a certain amount of climatic change due to the time lag
2
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between the emissions that have been released to date, and natural sequestration3. This
simple fact makes climate change adaptation unavoidable.
In order to effectively adapt to the coming changes, nations must be able to
properly assess vulnerability in a local context. The four factors proposed by the
vulnerability framework provide the developing world with a tool for doing so by
enabling them to identify the multiple pathways through which climate change will
interact with human activity, settlements, and health. I argue that this framework enables
the creation of adaptation policies that emphasize no-regrets solutions targeted at the
existing vulnerability of a given population to four factors: macroeconomic context,
socio-economic context, institutional context, and local environmental context.
With the aid of this framework, the potential vulnerability of children‟s health in
Bangladesh will be assessed as there is now strong evidence linking climatic changes to
human health. While climate change presents a daunting array of risks to human health,
research has shown that these changes will directly affect diarrheal disease as temperature
and precipitation changes lead to increased conditions that breed vector and waterborne
diseases that prey upon the young. Diarrheal disease, a leading cause of under-five
(under-five) mortality in nearly all low-income countries, has received considerable
attention as it kills over 1.8 million people every year, of which 90% are children underfive in developing countries4. These numbers will likely spike as increased flooding and
storm surge threaten what little sanitation infrastructure exists in coastal and riverine
slum settlements.
3

G. Prins & S. Rayner, The Wrong Trousers, Radically Rethinking Climate Policy (James Martin
Institute/Mackinder Centre, 2007), 36-37.
4
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Adaptation policies aimed at decreasing vulnerability to diarrheal disease will be
assessed for a level of climatic change similar to the B1 scenario of the recent fourth
assessment report by the Inter Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In this
scenario global emissions of carbon dioxide peak between 550 and 600 parts per million.
These emissions cause global temperatures to rise by 2 degrees Celsius, global sea levels
rise by around .3 meters, and results in the costs of adapting to the increased diarrheal
disease burden ranging from $3.333-10.689 million5.
Utilizing the vulnerability framework, it is determined that adaptation policies
must move beyond traditional public health interventions to include a range of policy
interventions that address the scale of the problem. The expanded array of policy options
that must be utilized to avoid the deleterious effects of climate change include
diversifying the economy away from single sector dependence, as well as many of the
constrictive policy measures that Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) have forced
developing countries to accept. These economic adjustments, combined with policies
aimed at lowering inequalities and providing livelihood generation will help to address
many of the cross-cutting issues of urbanization, poverty and migration. In an
institutional context, the strengthening of both national and local levels of government
and civil society will increase their ability to respond to extreme weather events, and
expand people‟s access to power and representation. These broader policy options will
complement the traditional public health approach provided by state and civil society
institutions of hygiene education, as well as the creation and “climate proofing” of water

5
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and sanitation infrastructure. Finally, the issues surrounding local environments are
addressed through the development of adaptation forces that provide environmental
improvement, economic opportunity, and disaster preparedness. These forces will be
integrally linked to institutional structures that devolve resources and authority to local
levels. Ultimately these policies provide Bangladesh with the ability to weather the
coming storm.

[- 5 -]

Chapter 2: Adaptation
“Adaptation is becoming a euphemism for social injustice on a global scale.
While the citizens of the rich world are protected from harm, the poor, the vulnerable and
the hungry are exposed to the harsh reality of climate change in their everyday lives…
We are drifting into a world of „adaptation apartheid‟. Allowing that drift to continue
would be short-sighted. Of course, rich countries can use their vast financial and
technological resources to protect themselves against climate change, at least in the
short-term—that is one of the privileges of wealth. But as climate change destroys
livelihoods, displaces people and undermines entire social and economic systems, no
country—however rich or powerful—will be immune to the consequences. In the longrun, the problems of the poor will arrive at the doorstep of the wealthy, as the climate
crisis gives way to despair, anger and collective security threats. None of this has to
happen. In the end the only solution to climate change is urgent mitigation. But we can—
and must—work together to ensure that the climate change happening now does not
throw human development into reverse gear. That is why I call on the leaders of the rich
world to bring adaptation to climate change to the heart of the international poverty
agenda—and to do it now, before it is too late.”—Desmond Tutu6

6

K. Watkins et al., “Human Development Report 2007.” United Nations Development Program,
(2007), 166.

-6-

In order to address the vulnerability induced by climate change adaptation is
critical. In their critique of the large-scale failing of current global climate policy, Prins
and Rayner specifically call for increased spending on adaptation measures to form an
integral piece of the post-Kyoto governance puzzle as “even the most stringent mitigation
efforts cannot avoid further impacts of climate change in the next few decades” 7. While
the IPCC and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
recognize both mitigation and adaptation as appropriate policy responses to climate
change, mitigation has been the overwhelming recipient of funding and attention up to
this point. This is due to the belief, held by many, allowing for adaptive measures will
serve to delay or obstruct attempts at mitigation8. The dilemma is that the beneficial
effects from mitigation measures will take many decades to incur 9. While the world
awaits these effects, millions will become increasingly vulnerable to a myriad of effects.
A callous and irresponsible refutation of the immediate need for adaptation policy
disregards the fate of these millions and places all levels of society in danger.
In many ways, adaptation measures are not radical departures from traditionally
advocated policy proposals. As the case for water and sanitation infrastructure in relation
to diarrheal disease and climate change will clearly demonstrate, the proposals embodied
in the MDGs are now nearly irrefutable. Adaptation measures will in many cases simply
involve ramping up efforts to achieve previously defined goals that have not yet been
attained. However, it is possible to mistake the forest for the trees so to speak, as climate
7

R.J.T. Klein, and S. Huq, et al., 2007: Inter-relationships between adaptation and mitigation. Climate
Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P.
Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson, Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK: 747.
8
Prins & Rayner, 35-37.
9
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change will have pervasive societal impacts that will also indirectly affect diarrheal
disease. Therefore adaptation policies aimed at limiting societal vulnerability to diarrheal
disease will likely include aspects that fall far outside traditionally advocated policies.
The importance of societal changes in the form of adaptation policies is best
evidenced by the drastic reduction in the costs of climate change they can bring about.
One recent global study estimates that $1 invested in pre-disaster risk management
activities in developing countries can prevent US$7 in losses 10. For example, in China, $3
billion was spent on flood defenses in the four decades prior to 2000, which is estimated
to have avoided $12 billion in losses11. These numbers are all the more important for
developing countries due to the lack of financial resources they will be able to muster, as
the global costs of increased climate variability will be large and most likely distributed
very unevenly12. The ability to adapt is thus emerging as a potential driver of wider
disparities in wealth, security and opportunities for human development and hence
vulnerability13.
Despite the strong economic arguments for adaptation, economic determinism is a
pitfall that must be avoided in adaptation efforts. The human and social capital that many
countries have utilized to create impressive disaster response efforts have occurred
largely in the absence of significant levels of economic resources. Some scholars argue
that strategies like rapid industrialization and GDP growth allow nations to better
economically manage the transition to a post-climate change world; such strategies,
10

Watkins et al., 176.
Watkins et al., 176.
12
Ian Burton, “Do We Have the Adaptive Capacity to Develop and Use the Adaptive Capacity to Adapt?”
In Climate Change, Adaptive Capacity and Development, edited by Joel B Smith, Richard JT Klein and
Saleemul Huq, London England: Imperial College Press, (1999): 138.
13
Watkins et al., 168-198.
11
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however, build the proverbial castle on a foundation of sand. These mal-adaptations fail
to address the broader picture of vulnerability to which societies must adapt as higher
levels of GDP and economic activity that are not spread evenly throughout society will
not reduce the vulnerability of the poor or marginalized in society. Therefore, it is
absolutely imperative that the many diverse linkages that drive vulnerability to climate
change and diarrheal disease be addressed in order to arrive at cross-cutting strategies
which attempt to simultaneously address the many separate, yet integral issues. While
mankind waits for the world to accept this fundamental truth, the developing world must
act now, or risk watching many of its hard-earned improvements in human development
be swept away by climate change.

Vulnerability: Exposure, Sensitivity, and Adaptive Capacity
To begin, vulnerability can be disaggregated into its three relevant components of
exposure, sensitivity, and resilience. This allows it to be “enabled” so to speak, giving
policymakers the ability to draft policies targeted at its specific components. Exposure
refers to the degree to which a system comes into contact with stress, sensitivity refers to
the degree to which a system is affected by exposure to stress, and resilience refers to the
ability of the system to recover from the damage associated with the stress 14. In relation
to climate change, the definition is slightly altered as vulnerability is seen as “a function
of the character, magnitude, and rate of climate variation to which a system is exposed,

14
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its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity.” 15 The primary difference in these definitions is
the use of the term adaptive capacity which is defined as “the ability of a system to
evolve in order to accommodate environmental hazards or policy change and to expand
the range of variability with which it can cope.”16 Ultimately, the disaggregation of
vulnerability into these three components allows for the formation of targeted polices
aimed at reducing either exposure or sensitivity, or increasing adaptive capacity.
Adaptation policy options deal with modifying or altering these various
components in order to reduce vulnerability17. To shape these policies as precisely and
accurately as possible it is necessary to identify which component of vulnerability
specific policies are meant to act upon. For example, are policies aimed at increasing
adaptive capacity by strengthening the institutional context of a country, or are they
aimed at reducing exposure to adverse environmental impacts by creating or
strengthening infrastructure? In many ways this question points to the complexity of
adaptation as the institutional context of a country is integrally linked to its
macroeconomic context and vice versa. Therefore many policies may address aspects of
each individual context despite the fact that they are aimed at either reducing exposure or
increasing adaptive capacity.

15

Neil Adger, "Vulnerability." Global Environmental Change 16, no. 3 (2006): 273.
Adger, 270.
17
Bary Smit and I. Burton, et al. "An anatomy of adaptation to climate change and variability." Climatic
Change 45, no 1 (2000): 202.
16

[- 10 -]

Adaptation: Who, What, How?
The most important questions pertaining to adaptation are who adapts, to what do
they adapt, and how does this adaptation occur?18 There are two main forms of
adaptation: autonomous and planned. In contrast to planned adaptation, autonomous
adaptation takes place on an ad-hoc basis in the absence of planning 19. Planned
adaptations are preferable to autonomous planning for a number of reasons, as
autonomous adaptations tend to be reactive and costly20. Planned adaptations utilize the
questions of who, what and how to enable adaptations that are conscious policy options,
multi-sectoral in nature, and aimed at altering either exposure levels, sensitivity, or
adaptive capacity in a society 21.
Who adapts, depends greatly on the scale of adaptation, be it local, national, or
international. In terms of the vulnerability framework and adaptation policy in this paper,
policymakers at the national level are those who are adapting. National policymakers are
chosen due to the fact that macro-level advances in adaptive capacity are likely to have a
broader impact on reducing vulnerability than micro-level adaptations. However, they
must enable adaptations at both local and international levels as the many linkages
between vulnerability and climate change will be shown to require action at all three of
these levels. The importance of national level adaptation planning is vital in facilitating
the ability to cope at a local level. In the absence of national level adaptations the
18

Smit et al., 200.
Bary Smit, and Olga Pilifosova, “From Adaptation to Adaptive Capacity and Vulnerability Reduction”
In Climate Change, Adaptive Capacity and Development, edited by Joel B Smith, Richard JT Klein and
Saleemul Huq, London England: Imperial College Press, (2003): 9-10
20
Smit & Pilifosova, 9-10.
21
S. Borron, Building Resilience for an Unpredictable Future: How Organic Agriculture Can Help
Farmers Adapt to Climate Change. United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (2006): 6.
19
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resilience at the local level is greatly reduced as it is rarely independent of the adaptive
capacity of the state22.
The importance of enabling local levels of adaptation cannot be overstated. The
devolution of decision making and resources to the local level will enable decisions to be
made closest to their application which serves to enhance their overall effectiveness 23.
This must be accompanied by national planning efforts and capacity building at local
levels in order to avoid the exacerbation of local inequalities. Indeed, without proper
access for vulnerable communities, the benefits of these adaptations will not be realized
at either level24. The success of adaptation efforts does not solely depend on creating
adaptive capacity, but on where it is created, who controls it, and who has access to its
benefits25. Who not only becomes those that are shaping the policy at the national level,
but those that are benefitting from it at a local level.
The question of what a set of national policymakers are adapting to refers to the
specific climate impact, as well as to the component of vulnerability related to that
impact. For example, a cyclone could be the specific impact a society is adapting to,
while the specific efforts could be aimed at either reducing exposure to the impacts of the
cyclone, reducing sensitivity to the impacts of the cyclone, or increasing adaptive
capacity to respond to the impacts of the cyclone. The two biggest questions then are how
policymakers determine which are the most important exposures and which component

22

Smit & Pilifosova, 23-24.
H. Mcgray, “Weathering the Storm: Options for Framing Adaptation and Development.” World
Resources Institute, (2007), 28.
24
Klein et al., 766-769.
25
Watkins et al., 173.
23
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of vulnerability is best to act upon. This provides multiple dilemmas for policymakers
regarding the prioritizing of adaptations.
Determining which exposures are of the highest priority requires the identification
of the multiple pathways through which a particular exposure may harm society. This
helps to reduce myopic adaptation policies that neglect the broader impacts singular
climate events or processes can have. In practice, this means that development activities
are likely the best adaptation responses, as they respond to broader issues of vulnerability
that climate change stimuli are likely to affect 26. In the case of cyclones, the impacts are
more confined to specific locales, while temperature rises can have pervasive effects on
diverse regions and levels of society through, for example, reductions in agricultural
production. It is not entirely feasible to shape a policy that adapts to temperature rise as it
manifests itself in a variety of ways at multiple levels of society. In contrast, adaptations
to specific events are much more manageable. However, the indirect impacts of climate
change are likely to be of a higher magnitude which creates the need to identify a means
of effective adaptation.
Once exposures that cause the largest levels of harm to a society are identified,
the problem of determining the most appropriate component of vulnerability to target still
remains. A solution to this problem lies in the concept of “no-regrets” adaptations. A
recent approach to adaptation has been to identify sensitivities in a system or community
to climate change and then manage these sensitivities in terms of adaptation 27. This

26

B. Apuuli, and J. Wright, et al. "Reconciling national and global priorities in adaptation to climate
change: with an illustration from Uganda." Environmental Monitoring and Assessment 61, no 1 (2000):
155-159.
27
Smit & Pilifosova, 9-11.
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approach to the question of what is far superior as it gives policymakers the ability to
create no-regrets adaptations to climate change that can be justified within a development
framework regardless of whether climate change occurs or not 28. This means that even if
many of the uncertainties surrounding specific impacts related to climate change are too
large to justify climate specific responses, a “no-regrets” adaptation response that
addresses existing societal sensitivities can still be advocated. The result is that even in
the absence of climate change impacts, society benefits from these adaptation efforts, and
time and effort is not lost debating the specifics levels of climate change exposures that
are inherently uncertain.
How adaptations are carried out in order to reduce societal sensitivities can now
be addressed. Reducing sensitivity by policymakers at a national level in response to
pervasive climate exposures has only recently begun. At a national policy level The
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has helped to
spur action on adaptation by creating the Nairobi Work Program (NWP) 29. While the
limitations of the United Nations are well known, the potential contribution that the NWP
and UNFCCC can have for international adaptation efforts may still be significant. The
programs may play an effective role as a catalyzing agent in creating momentum for
adaptation activities and funding allowing information and resources to be marshaled,
while encouraging locally appropriate solutions.
This has begun to occur as the UNFCCC has allocated funding for developing
countries to create National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs) under the Global

28
29

Apuuli et al., 155-159.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, http://www.unfccc.int.
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Environmental Facilities Least Developed Country Fund (GEF-LDCF). NAPAs identify
the urgent and immediate adaptation needs of a country for which “further delay could
increase vulnerability or lead to increased costs at a later stage” 30. Over 40 of the least
developed countries have received funding under the convention to prepare their NAPAs,
which draw on existing information and community-level input to prioritize adaptation
plans31. Unfortunately, the program suffers from severe budget constraints as a paltry $32
million has thus far been allocated, of which $12 million has been spent on the NAPA
process32.
Despite funding shortfalls, NAPAs are able to provide a country with a much
needed assessment of the specific exposures that will be faced by different regions of the
country, sectors of the economy, as well as social and ethnic groups. It also provides a
clear signal to the international community about the importance of adaptation for
developing countries that could catalyze increased funding in the form of ODA or other
international resources. Finally, despite significant resource constraints on the NAPA
process and adaptation in general, institutional and infrastructural capacity for adaptation
efforts aimed at disaster risk management have been created, and in many cases, without
high levels of national wealth33. However, the impetus for action, as well as funding for
that action is thus far extremely limited.
The most crucial shortcoming in need of remedy is the lack of integration of
NAPAs into decision making at all levels of government. The case of poverty reduction
30

www.unfccc.int.
www.unfccc.int.
32
Verheyen, Roda. “Adaptation Funding: Legal and Institutional Issues.” In Climate Change, Adaptive
Capacity and Development, edited by Joel B Smith, Richard JT Klein and Saleemul Huq, London England:
Imperial College Press, (2003): 165.
33 Watkins et al., 196-198.
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strategies is a glaring example. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs),
prepared for the World Bank, are development plans that were a precondition for access
to debt relief while serving as a framework for better coordination between development
partners34. Ideally, the NAPA and PRSP approaches should have led to “common project
proposals and increased resources allocated to converging priorities”35. In practice,
however, a fundamental disunity in the efforts and implementations of the two
approaches exists as evidenced by a widespread failure of efforts to mainstream
adaptation into PRSPs36. The UNFCCC has cited a lack of cooperation among ministries
as a major barrier to progress on adaptation which is conclusively demonstrated by the
case of NAPAs and PRSPs37. In order to bring about real progress on reduction in
societal sensitivity to climate change, key governmental departments in various sectors
must be involved in the planning and development of adaptation strategies 38.
As with most public policy decisions, the success of any individual adaptation or
policy will hinge on the extent to which the strategy recognizes “the systemic nature of
climate impacts” and thus the need for participation by many sectors to reduce
sensitivity39. It is therefore of vital importance to safeguard adaptations by avoiding
vertical myopia in project and policy planning. The vulnerability framework proposed in
this paper effectively demonstrates why vertical programs are doomed to failure as

34 Mcgray et al., 34-36.
35 Mcgray et al., 34-36.
36 Mcgray et al., 34-36.
37 “Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities, and Adaptation in Developing Countries.” United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, (2007), 44.
38 Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities, and Adaptation in Developing Countries, 44.
39 Haines, A., and R. Kovats, et al. "Climate change and human health: impacts, vulnerability, and
mitigation." Lancet 367, (2006): 2107.
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climate change impacts are likely to affect multiple levels and sectors of society
simultaneously.
Another pitfall of which policymakers must be wary, is mal-adaptation, or the
need to adapt to adaptations. The green revolution is a prime example of the possibility of
such mal-adaptations actually increasing societal sensitivity. While the green revolution
undoubtedly increased agricultural yields due to a variety of innovations, it has been
seriously criticized for exacerbating inequalities between small and large landowners, and
creating a larger gap between the rich and the poor. It has also been criticized for
requiring large amounts of unsustainable inputs of energy, chemical fertilizers and
water40. This is not to say that the green revolution was not successful, it merely
highlights the need for a thoughtful critique of any adaptation policy in order to avoid as
many of the negative side effects policies can have.

40 Kates, R. "Cautionary tales: adaptation and the global poor." Climatic Change 45, no 1 (2000): 11-12.
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Chapter 3: Climate Change Vulnerability Framework
Vulnerability induced by climate change lies in the complex interactions between
non-climatic sources of change and stress, including physical infrastructure, and human
social and political systems41. The key to adaptation is properly assessing these
interactions and identifying the key mediating factors in order to reduce the vulnerability
of industry, settlements, and society42. In many ways, vulnerability to climate change
exposes existing vulnerabilities within a society. Assessments of these vulnerabilities to
climate events stem largely from the natural hazards field that seeks to identify the
reasons that certain segments of the population suffer disproportionate effects of climate
events. In addition, there is a large body of work on the vulnerabilities that determine
negative health outcomes. Some of the most significant factors identified by this body of
literature are population density, level of economic development, food availability,
income level and distribution, local environmental conditions, pre-existing health status
and the quality and availability of public health care43. These factors have been integrated
with the results of the most recent set of reports released by the IPCC, which identified a

41

T.J. Wilbanks, and P. Romero Lankao, et al., 2007: Industry, settlement and society. Climate Change
2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J.
van der Linden and C.E. Hanson, Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK: 359.
42
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43
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Responses.” World Health Organization, (2003), 220-262.
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set of factors that rendered industries, settlements and societies most vulnerable to
climate change. These included local environmental factors such as coastal and river
flood plain location and extreme weather activity, economic factors such as a dependence
on climate-sensitive resources, and the existence of rapid urbanization 44. It is from these
three bodies of literature that a broader picture of vulnerability has been derived.
The resulting vulnerability framework paints a development picture full of
staggering setbacks. These obstructions will arise as higher temperatures, rising sea
levels, and increased extreme weather activity prey upon the weaknesses of societies as a
whole, as well as upon particular, vulnerable groups within societies. While the planet is
ensured a certain level of warming due to emissions that have already been released,
numerous scientists have begun to identify feedback loops, whereby the impacts of
warming intensify the process of warming itself. For example, the melting of arctic sea
ice is increasing warming effects due to increased exposure of dark ocean waters. These
dark waters absorb more sun light than white snow pack and hence more of its energy
and heat. Few of the General Circulation Models (GCMs) accurately capture these
feedback loops as many recent papers highlight that the impacts predicted for as far as
2100 have now been reforecast for 2030, an arctic summer free of ice being one of
them45. It is in this context that the conservative nature of the climate change scenario
utilized in this paper must be weighed.
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Local Environmental Context
A country‟s natural resources and local environmental conditions can determine
many aspects of society including economic development, human health, and even
political cooperation and integration. This component of the framework is largely
exogenous to policy making as it is simply impossible to remove entire mountain ranges
or raise hundreds of miles of low-lying coastal areas. Therefore, the framework begins
with geographic, topographic, environmental degradation and local weather conditions as
a background from which countries can either reduce, or add to, climate change
vulnerability. These components are all integrally linked to climate change as many
impacts are simply alterations to existing weather patterns and environments. This means
that countries will not likely suffer from previously unknown environmental stresses due
to climate change alone. The increased vulnerability of a nation to climatic changes is
therefore linked to existing levels of adaptation to climate events. Furthermore, economic
development and land use patterns cause environmental degradation that exposes them to
the negative effects of natural hazards.
One of the first and foremost determinants of vulnerability is geography. Existing
geographic vulnerability can take several forms. In terms of economic vulnerability it has
been readily observed that countries that lack ocean access in the form of a trading port
are often much less developed than their neighbors who do enjoy such access. Examples
of poor landlocked countries from all regions of the world abound, including Bolivia,
Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Niger, Chad, Nepal etc. While this geographic determinism is
overly simplistic (Switzerland is one of the richest countries in the world), it is
[- 20 -]

undoubtedly true that to an extent it can hamper economic activity reducing a
governments access to trade, taxation, and revenue generation.
In relation to climate change however, countries that have large proportions of
their populations in coastal zones, especially low elevation coastal zones (defined as the
contiguous area along the coast less than ten meters above sea level), are at significant
risk of natural hazards due to extreme weather activity. This negates some of the benefits
of access to trade and economic opportunity that coastal locations provide. This exposure
is all the more severe for coastal economies that are linked to natural resources that are
themselves vulnerable to natural hazards. For example, coastal locations dependent on
tourism or agricultural development for revenue can face significant threats. This
vulnerability, however, varies widely by region, as many coastal regions face very little
extreme weather activity, while others such as the Caribbean and Southeast Asia incur
significant annual damage.
Coastal locations also create vulnerability to sea level rise. According to the
fourth assessment report released by the IPCC, global mean temperatures are expected to
increase anywhere from 2-6 degrees Celsius, resulting in a .18 to .59 meter sea level
rise46. These predictions have come from observations spanning the forty-year period
1963-2003 when sea levels rose at an average rate of 1.8mm a year 47. That rate increased
from 1993-2003 to about 3.1 mm/year, suggesting feedback loops that were approaching

46

IPCC, 2007: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA:
5.
47
IPCC, 2007: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, 5.

[- 21 -]

alarming levels48. At merely a 2 degree change in average temperatures, the IPCC
predicts that global sea levels will rise by .18-.48 meters49. This is particularly important
for the 13%50 of the worlds' population now living in the low elevation coastal zone.

Figure 3.1

Source: Global Warming Art, 2007
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These populations will likely be increasingly exposed to inundation caused not
only by rising sea levels but larger storm surges. This is highly problematic as
observations show that over the past 50 years tropical storms have been lasting 60%
longer and spinning winds 50% more powerful51. These increased wind speeds will likely
lead to larger levels of storm surge and thus higher levels of damage if coastal
vulnerability is not properly addressed 52.
Geographic location is also important to the extent that a country‟s natural
resources can be manipulated by its neighbors. This vulnerability is most evident in water
supplies, as international river basins account for the majority of river basins, covering
some 45.3% of the earth‟s land surface and affecting around 40% of the world‟s
population53. These basins can pose difficult tasks for nations attempting to utilize scarce
water resources.

Due to the transboundary nature of managing these basins, few

mechanisms for dispute resolution are available for countries, and the international law
that does exist is at times contradictory. Fortunately, riparian nations have cooperated far
more often than not since 194854. However, significant vulnerabilities still exist for many
countries that face regional power inequities.
Compounding the problems associated with the lack of strong legal institutions
and mechanisms to resolve disputes are rapidly expanding human populations that have
increased water scarcity and induced deteriorating water quality in many areas of the
world. Numerous countries around the world are classified as water-stressed, largely
51
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resulting from unsustainable water uses and rapidly expanding populations 55. Many of
these areas intensify water issues by exceeding the land‟s natural carrying capacity for
human populations by relying heavily on underground aquifers to supply their water
needs. The resulting chronic water shortages affect human and ecosystem health, as well
as economic development making water supply issues critically important.
Tensions surrounding water supply issues will be further complicated by climate
change as it alters local weather conditions that determine precipitation. Increased
temperatures are already leading to greater seasonal differences in water availability
paradoxically resulting in both increased drought and flooding occurrence. The IPCC
predicts that climate change will cause dry regions to experience a decrease in water
availability due to river runoff of 10-30% by 205056. This will dramatically increase
vulnerability, as even relatively small changes to water systems in the form of
temperature and rainfall are usually amplified by a factor as high as six in seasonal water
flows57.
The added stress to water systems, especially in arid regions, will combine with
development pressures to diminish a population‟s access to adequate amounts of quantity
and quality of water58. This could be particularly harmful for domestic urban users that
traditionally receive a fraction of the allotment that more “economically productive”
55
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users such as agriculture or industry do. However, it will likely also hamper agricultural
productivity, as agriculture and industry make up the overwhelming bulk of the demands
placed on the water supply59. With decreasing water supplies due to climate change and
increasing demands due to rapid growth rates, as well as agricultural and industrial
activity, the developing world, is facing an acute crisis of water scarcity60.
In contrast to the issues surrounding drought, flooding events that are expected to
increase with climatic changes are more readily affected by topographic factors.
Topography, or “the lay of the land”, consists of plains, rolling hills, or mountains, along
with the type and extent of vegetative cover that occurs within a country. Vegetative
cover is important as it provides a variety of benefits to human settlements, including
dampening the effects of extreme weather activity. For example, in coastal locations
mangrove forests have been proven to provide a natural defense to cyclones, as the 2004
Asian tsunami clearly demonstrated. The existence of shrubs and trees on hillsides also
provides an anchor for soil that avoids mudslides during heavy rainfall events. This also
serves to dampen the effects of flooding on downstream settlements as it obstructs the
flow of water. Finally, vegetation is a source of raw materials for construction as well as
trade61.
Societies that lack the important benefits of vegetative cover, or have reduced
these benefits through landscape denuding or deforestation, place themselves at
considerable risk of flooding events. In burgeoning coastal populations, this has occurred
as increased economic activity has placed high levels of demand on natural resources that
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61
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rapidly degrades natural environments. The loss of coastal wetlands and mangroves is a
direct result of this activity62. For example, many wetland areas have been drained for
development purposes or to reduce the prevalence of malaria which has removed natural
buffers to tidal floods63. As populations increasingly move towards coastal locations, land
use changes and development of various kinds further threaten natural ecosystems that
serve as buffers between the ravages of the sea and human settlements 64. Unfortunately,
these land use changes are not likely to abate, as projections are that 30% of global
coastal wetlands will be lost within the coming century65.
Urban areas are particularly vulnerable as natural vegetation has been replaced by
large tracts of paved land that decrease the land‟s ability to absorb water, leading to
prolonged, heavy flooding66. The vulnerability of urban areas to flooding was vividly
illustrated by the Maharashtra floods in India, including the highly publicized Mumbai
flooding. These floods were caused by a record 944 mm of rain leading to a loss of over
1,000 lives and more than $250 million (USD)67. This extreme weather event, combined
with inadequate drainage facilities and a 40% reduction in coastal mangroves to grind the
normally bustling city to a halt 68. The vulnerability experienced by urban areas will be
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greatly affected by climate change, as increases in precipitation in wet months collide
with losses in vegetative cover to increase flooding events. Estimates place the increase
in rainfall and runoff between 10-40%, leading to significant vulnerability for urban
environments69.
Reductions in vegetative cover are only one example of environmental
degradation that can create vulnerability. While environmental degradation can take
multiple forms, in this context, it is defined as a reduction in the services created by the
environment caused by human activity. Other examples include salinization and
desertification due to intensive farming techniques, deforestation due to industrial and
agricultural development, and chemical pollution arising from industrial development.
Losses in forest cover are particularly important for the anchor effect that vegetation has
on soil. The loss of this anchor effect due to deforestation places communities at an
increased risk of soil erosion during rain events 70. Increased flooding also occurs as water
is less obstructed during rainfall events which can also induce mudslides 71. In terms of
human health, deforestation can also introduce new diseases into peri-urban
environments by creating habitats where disease vectors, such as mosquitoes, can thrive
thereby introducing potentially deadly diseases like malaria or dengue72. Ultimately,
environmental degradation can seriously reduce environmental resilience which,
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combined with climate change, land use changes, pollution, and the overexploitation of
resources, is likely to exceed the resiliency of ecosystems within this century73.
It is important to note that environmental degradation is integrally linked to other
components of the framework, including economic development and agricultural
commodity or natural resources dependence for developing countries. In many cases the
overexploitation of land and natural resources that create short-term profits often result in
long term environmental degradation that can have lasting effects on natural
environments. It also affects the socio-economic context by reducing rural incomes and
creating conditions for increased migration to urban centers.
Ultimately, damage to society will be both direct and indirect, occurring where
climate hazards and societal vulnerability converge74. However, the devastating societal
impacts of these hazards are not a foregone conclusion. For example, Cuba has
constructed infrastructure, utilizing relatively little capital, in one of the world‟s most
extreme tropical cyclone zones. It has successfully used this system to save lives and
limit damage to property without a developed economy by implementing an effective
early warning system, along with a highly developed civil defense infrastructure based on
community mobilization75. This example clearly demonstrates the need to assess these
impacts in relation to macroeconomic, socio-economic, and institutional factors in order
to accurately assess, and respond to, vulnerability.
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Figure 3.2

Underlying Drivers of Vulnerability in Bold

Macroeconomic Context
Development theorists for decades have stressed economic development,
industrialization and urbanization as pathways to prosperity and security76. Ironically
these policy prescriptions could be what are driving much of the vulnerability in the
developing world today. Following the debt crisis of the 1970s and 80s, many developing
countries were forced to turn to international institutions such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) for financial assistance. This “assistance” came in the form of
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) that imposed draconian measures for balancing
budgets and achieving macroeconomic stability. In many cases countries were forced to
rely on a narrow set of export commodities in order to pay debt obligations on these
loans. In addition to SAPs, countries were advised by international institutions and
donors to develop a limited set of exports to secure foreign exchange for such vital
purchases as technology and industrial equipment to fuel the process of industrialization.
For many countries the only option was to exploit their natural environments for
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resources or agricultural commodities. The net result was an over-reliance on natural
resources for national income and economic development 77.
The development of single sector economic dependence places countries in a
precarious position in an increasingly volatile global economy. This is evidenced by the
large price swings commodities such as coffee and cocoa endure. Unfortunately, this
problem is not unique to commodity production. Fishing and tourism are other sources of
developing country income that are particularly vulnerable to both economic whims.
Agriculture, fishing, and tourism are also heavily dependent on climatic conditions. Any
significant changes in local weather activity including increases in flooding or drought
brought about by changes in precipitation, can dramatically affect the economies of
developing nations78.
In addition to single sector economic dependence, coastal population shifts place
nations and communities at considerable risk of natural and man-made hazards as
described in the local environmental context. These shifts were driven in part by
colonialism and the expansion of international trade, resulting in the development of
large coastal cities. Nowhere is this more evident than in the developing world where, on
average, 14% of populations reside in low elevation coastal zones, in comparison with
10% of OECD countries79. This is even more marked in urban populations, with the
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developing world having 21% of its population in this area, compared to only 11% of
OECD countries80.
The net effect of these recent trends in economic development has been to reduce
macroeconomic stability in the developing world. This has affected the health and wellbeing of these populations in a variety of ways. In the case of SAPs, many of the lending
restrictions made by the IMF were aimed at balancing budgets to produce stable
macroeconomic environments. This IMF policy resulted in reductions in social spending
programs for education and healthcare, shrinking the small social safety net these poor
countries could afford. Citizens in these countries are now forced to spend scarce
personal income on these services. In countries where a majority of the population
struggles to earn enough income to feed themselves, the purchase of health services or
education, are luxuries few can afford. This has been compounded by single sector
economic dependence, as high price volatility of primary commodities reduced wages
and income that were needed to cover these expenses, previously provided to the
population by the government. The resulting vulnerability of the population as a whole
has thus largely resulted from macroeconomic changes.
Climate change is likely to wreak havoc on unstable economies that are overly
reliant on natural resources and agricultural production. Evidence has steadily
accumulated that increasing temperatures, changes in precipitation, and alterations to
growing seasons are already occurring. It has been estimated that for a 2 degree warming
scenario, climate change could cause reductions in GDP of up to 3% in the developing
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world81. These impacts will cause reductions in economic gains for nations as a whole
while greatly endangering poor households that depend on these climate sensitive sectors
for their livelihoods. The resulting instability will add yet another layer of stress upon
unstable macroeconomic environments in developing countries.
Agriculture commodity production is perhaps the most vulnerable form of single
sector economic dependence in relation to climate change. Temperature increases of 1-3
degrees are expected to cause earlier and heavier spring discharge of water stored in the
form of ice and snow. This alters the availability of water necessary for particular stages
in the growing cycle. In addition, precipitation changes occurring at this level of warming
alter the seasonal distribution of rainfall, creating similar effects on agricultural
production. Ultimately, any change in global mean temperature above three degrees is
likely to negatively affect agricultural yields in all regions of the world as drought
affected areas increase in extent, while heavy precipitation events increase the incidence
of flooding and significantly alter crop production82.
The resulting macroeconomic downturn will severely impact economic activity
resulting in lower levels of foreign exchange, and tax revenue. In addition to the resulting
macroeconomic instability, famines can arise due to economic factors that take the place
of supply shortages thereby forcing “artificial famines” as supply reductions lead to price
increases83. This can happen as declining yields force countries to divert crop production
destined for domestic consumption to foreign sale in order to secure foreign exchange
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needed for debt repayments or other activities. The potential harm climate change could
cause will interact with increasing demands for food, food price volatility associated with
macroeconomic instability, and the reduction of state-sponsored agricultural extension
services that all helped fuel the recent food crisis from 2006-200884.
As a result of the implications of macroeconomic instability, developing country
vulnerability is thought to be more or less dictated by a lack of economic development. In
this view, high levels of economic development provide resources for the management or
reduction of vulnerability, while low levels of development greatly hinder it. However, it
is important to note that increased economic activity does not necessarily reduce
vulnerability. Economic determinism fails to recognize the vast reservoir of adaptations
that human societies have built up over centuries of habitation in many extremely
vulnerable areas of the world, many of which are greatly aided by human, social, and
natural capital rather than fiscal resources85.
Even so, governments will likely seek to insulate important or vulnerable
economic sectors. In general, the least impacted sectors are likely to be industrial, while
the most heavily impacted are agricultural, a situation that overwhelmingly affects the
developing world. Inevitably, the weight of the impacts on the most greatly affected
communities within a nation will be lost in national statistics that average out economic
costs in relation to national GDP. In the absence of disaggregation of economic effects on
local communities and individual sectors, a nation‟s vulnerability will increase as
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generalized responses do not address specific sectoral or local economic contexts and
squander scarce resources86.
Ultimately climate change exposes the fragile nature of these economies. These
changes will likely cause harmful reductions in state revenues as natural resources and
agricultural commodity production is reduced. These reductions will lead to further
decreases in state spending on social programs, a situation which has already led to
severe repercussions for society, particularly for the poor. It will also reduce demand for
labor and job opportunities as the macroeconomic situation deteriorates.

Figure 3.3

Underlying Drivers of Vulnerability in Bold
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Socio-economic Context
In addition to reductions in social spending, the population in need of these
programs has grown dramatically in recent years as dramatic population growth has
masked achievements in poverty reduction. Over the past century, unprecedented
population growth marked by increasing urbanization has been witnessed across all
regions of the world. The United Nations Population Division (UNPD) projects that this
trend is unlikely to abate as the world is expected to experience a population increase of
2.5 billion people by the year 2050 which is equivalent to the entire world population of
195087. Not only will the developing world absorb the majority of these new inhabitants,
increasing its population from 5.4 to 7.9 billion people by 2050, the UNPD projects that
the total number of urban dwellers worldwide will account for 6.4 billion of the total
world population of 9.2 billion. 88. These numbers are staggering and form the oft-cited
hockey stick graph of human population explosion utilized by a variety of academics,
activists, and politicians to visually demonstrate the dynamic nature of human expansion.
The complete inversion of the rural/urban population composition of 1950,
accompanied by the squalor of slum settlements, provides unprecedented impetus for a
significant shift in development planning and policy. While increases in population size
are largely due to the success of public health interventions, the socio-economic
conditions of this population are overwhelmingly determined by urbanization that is
integrally linked with economic development and the creation of vast differences in
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wealth between rural and urban areas. Between 1970 and 2000, the income gap between
the richest and the poorest 20% of the world population shifted from a factor of 32 to
7889. This was most pronounced in urban areas of the developing world where an
estimated 70% of urban populations now live in slum-like conditions90. Incredibly, within
the next 30 years the number of slum dwellers is likely to increase to about 2 billion 91, the
majority of whom are expected to reside in small (under 500,000) and medium-sized
cities (1-5 million) 92.
To put these statistics into context, a staggering 99.4% of urban dwellers in
Ethiopia and Chad reside in slums 93. The poorest urban populations are most likely found
in Maputo and Kinshasa where two-thirds of the population “earn less than the cost of
their minimum required daily nutrition”94. The term „inequality‟ hardly defines the stark
contrast between slum settlements and penthouse high rises that have become staples of
urban cityscapes, as the world economy increasingly becomes integrated along laissezfaire, neo-liberal guidelines. These conditions overwhelmingly impact specific
demographic groups, namely women, children and the elderly. For example, of the
140,000 deaths caused by cyclones in Bangladesh, mortality rates for children under 10
years of age were six times that of adult men95. Ultimately, slum environments provide
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drastically inadequate protection for the health and livelihoods of these vulnerable
segments of society.
Slum settlements create vulnerability for a number of reasons. First, they are often
located in extremely vulnerable areas, such as riverine or coastal floodplains often
lacking many of the most basic public goods like piped water and sanitation
infrastructure. In addition, education and employment are extremely difficult to obtain in
slum areas reinforcing a cycle of poverty and exacerbating inequalities. These problems
are compounded by high population densities, informal housing arrangements, and high
concentrations of solid and liquid wastes96. The conditions created by high concentrations
of solid and liquid wastes and the ineffective or absent efforts at removing this waste
breed infectious diseases that are easily spread by the high population densities of slum
areas. Many of these problems are linked to rapid unplanned urbanization where even
basic urban planning zoning laws either don‟t exist or are not enforced. The resulting
poor health is fed by, and feeds, poverty.
Despite these conditions, migrants continue to stream into urban environments for
a variety of reasons. Urban migration is often a last resort for poor families around the
world, and involves a somewhat voluntary choice in movement, including when, where
and how migration occurs
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many rural populations turn to migration as a livelihood diversification strategy 98. The
problem is further intensified by rural urban wage differentials that provide an impetus to
seek opportunity in urban areas99.
Compounding these problems is the fact that in many areas of the developing
world, rural elites have consolidated ownership of fertile land, forcing subsistence
farmers onto increasingly marginal land. This causes a variety of environmental
problems, including soil degradation and desertification, as farmers are forced into
unsustainable farming practices in order to survive. Eventually, these practices force
people from unproductive land to search for scarce opportunities available in urban
environments. These migrants are known as environmental refugees. While the forces
driving environmental migration can arise from gradual deterioration of local
environments, they can also be caused by the onset of sudden environmental disasters.
Oftentimes victims of highly publicized disasters receive large amounts of foreign aid to
mitigate the impacts of displacement while millions of others uprooted by gradual
environmental change, considered migrants, receive comparatively little support. This
situation aggravates the problems of the urban poor and leads to ever burgeoning slum
settlements100.
Climate change will greatly affect many of these vulnerabilities. The dire situation
faced by slum settlements will be exacerbated as the environmental risks urban
communities face as described in the local environmental context increase. It will also
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lead to increases in urbanization that will further compound these problems by reducing
negatively impacting already highly unstable rural livelihoods. It will likely increase
urbanization as a variety of gradual environmental changes such as desertification, sea
level rise, and acidification of oceans, will all likely drive rural to urban migration as well
as further consolidations of urban areas that are less heavily impacted. These gradual
changes, exemplified by an upsurge in average temperature, are accompanied by
fluctuations in weather extremes, such as drought and hurricanes, that will combine to
significantly affect population mobility patterns in the years to come 101.
These two sets of environmental drivers can be conceptualized as climate
processes in the case of long-term changes and climate events in the case of singular,
extreme weather events102. The linkage between climate events and displacement or
migration, is relatively apparent, while migration induced by climate processes can at
times be masked by other “pull” factors such as the lure of economic gain. However,
climate processes will likely lead to long-term migration flows regardless of “pull”
factors103.
Africa provides a telling case of how climate processes are driving rural to urban
migration. Over the last 50 years, Sub-Saharan Africa has averaged a growth rate of
urbanization 10 times that of OECD countries 104. This urbanization has often been linked
to the pull effect of economic opportunity and increased living standards on the rural
poor. While a number of factors are driving this exorbitant rate of urbanization, a recent
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study found that increasingly erratic and declining rainfall patterns have led to a push,
rather than pull, effect in rural/urban migration, which both Western and Sub-Saharan
Africa are particularly prone to due to their local environmental conditions 105.
Even in the absence of an artificial famine, declining rainfall will reduce yields
and likely push subsistence farmers into degrading land practices as they eke out what
little productivity is left in their land. Declining yields could induce large scale rural
landholders to seek further land consolidations to ensure adequate crop yields and
income. They may achieve these consolidations by purchasing the land of subsistence
farmers or via political or legal means. This poses threats to long-term development
prospects in rural areas, as the increasingly severe effects of climate change lead to a
radical transformation of traditional livelihoods, including long-term and permanent
migration to urban centers106. These new streams of urban migrants will likely follow
existing patterns of rural to urban migration, ultimately magnifying the negative effects
of urban living through higher population densities, larger and more frequent slum
settlements, and increases in poverty and inequality107.
Further increases in rural to urban migration will lead to pronounced vulnerability
for industries, settlements and societies, where rapid urbanization is already occurring
that will overwhelmingly affect the urban poor and those living in slum settlements.
Large, unplanned slum settlements located in areas already prone to flooding, storm
surge, and other natural hazards will be the most vulnerable as climate change increases
the incidence of these events. The risky locations of many of these settlements, namely
105
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those in coastal locations, will expose societies to sea level rise and the many facets of a
faster hydrological cycle through increased flooding that will wreak havoc on urban
societies108.

Figure 3.4

Underlying Drivers of Vulnerability in Bold

Institutional Context
The squalid conditions slum dwellers find themselves in are often mediated by the
effective, or ineffective, actions of municipal and state governments, and civil society
actors. These two sets of actors create the institutional context of a country and generally
limit or increase the vulnerability created by the local environment, macroeconomic, and
socioeconomic contexts. The harsh reality is that many governments in the developing
world currently fail to adequately respond to existing vulnerability. Adding the additional
stress of climate change will undoubtedly aggravate this situation. As with all of the
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factors that make up vulnerability in relation to climate change, the significance of the
institutional context lies in its interactions with various other stresses including negative
impacts on economic and social structures109.
The intersection of institutional capacity and climate change impacts displays the
adaptive capacity a country wields110. The adaptive capacity of a nation relies on its
institutional resilience, stability, robustness, and flexibility in the face of climatic
stimuli111. These factors are apparent in the sharp contrast between adaptive capacity in
response to hurricane activity in Honduras and the United States. While both are exposed
to similar climate stresses, Hurricane Mitch accounted for damages equal to 75% of
Honduran GDP in 1998, while Hurricane Andrew accounted for losses less than 1% of
American GDP in 1992112. These two reactions to natural hazards demonstrate the vital
importance of institutional context in determining vulnerability. Ultimately, the
characteristics

of

climate

resilient

institutions

include

revenue

generation,

decentralization, institutional flexibility, and participation, as they are all vitally
important for determining institutional vulnerability to climate change 113.
One of the most direct impacts governments can have on reducing vulnerability is
through the provision of basic public goods such as water, sanitation, drainage, health
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services, education and improved housing that tax generation allows 114. In low and
middle-income countries, the provision of these services is often constrained by the
government‟s ability to levy and collect taxes on domestic economic activity and
international trade. The importance of government revenue is therefore linked to the
macroeconomic context and climate change impacts that reduce GDP. In addition to
reductions in revenue from crop and other natural resource failures, government revenues
may also decrease as they respond to an increased number of climate events. This will
prove immensely costly as adequate funding is lacking in many developing countries for
management of current climate events and variability115.
The added costs brought about by the increasing number and severity of climatic
events will undoubtedly stretch vulnerable nations to their limits. This is unfortunately
colliding with an international trend to reduce official development assistance (ODA) and
push for a heavier reliance on trade, private investment and the mobilization of domestic
funds116. This trend mirrors many of the neo-liberal developments of the past thirty years
and will prove to further increase vulnerability. The combination of reductions in
funding, along with improper spending, will tax what little resources local governments
have revealing institutional vulnerabilities as governments are unable to raise additional
funds from the local tax base, or unable to secure resources from the national government
due to centralization of power and resources117.
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This situation is worsened by a lack of human capital in the form of educated and
competent civil servants. The provision of human capital is difficult for many developing
countries as one of the public goods that is lacking is education. Those who can afford
what limited access to education does exist often either voluntarily, or for a lack of
options, seek opportunities in the developed world. This phenomenon of “brain drain”
exacerbates the problem of a lack of qualified and educated people available for
governmental posts.
The lack of competent and effective civil servants can drastically affect the
flexibility of governmental institutions which is vital to responding to emerging health
threats as well as to natural disasters brought about by changing economic, social, and
natural environments. This problem is worsened by the fact that in many areas of the
developing world governmental corruption is a serious problem, as those who do manage
to secure government posts often profit from existing arrangements, or lack the proper
incentive to make serious changes to existing power structures. This is evidenced by the
power many central governments enjoy often at the expense of lower levels of
government118. This results in centralization of power and resources that further
institutionalizes political rigidity in responding to social, economic, and environmental
stresses. This has had tragic consequences for the AIDS epidemic, as the failure to
adequately respond to the epidemic by many sub-Saharan governments clearly
demonstrates119.
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In the absence of effective institutions, governments face institutional rigidity that
can interact with climate change impacts to form mal-adaptations based on past
experience or ideology120. These mal-adaptations may prove particularly harmful for
developing countries that have followed the strictures of SAPs. A telling example is the
wisdom of economies of scale in resource planning. For example, the construction of
dams has been trumpeted for decades, despite the very significant social and
environmental impacts that these projects can have on populations and environments. It is
still very unclear as to the net benefit these projects have when all externalities are
included in project costs. However, solutions like these are being put forward as both
mitigative and adaptive responses for their supposed ability to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions while managing dwindling water supplies and increased flooding. Dams not
only increase greenhouse gas emissions through the decomposition of trapped organic
matter, but heighten the vulnerability of displaced communities 121. The example of dams
is a microcosm of mal-adaptations that institutional rigidity can cause.
In addition to institutional rigidity, centralization of power and resources can
greatly increase vulnerability to natural hazards and, therefore, climate change.
Decentralization has emerged as a response to the problems associated with national level
planning and mal-adaptations that lacked local context. It has accompanied many of the
SAPs in an effort to build local levels of government that are capable of addressing their
own needs in order to sever their ties to strong centralized state institutions. Despite what
may seem a good prescription for empowering local communities, decentralization has
120

Adger, 2003, 65-67.
D. Biello, "The Dam Building Boom: Right Path to Clean Energy." Yale Environment 360, 2009,
http://e360.yale.edu.
121

[- 45 -]

oftentimes exacerbated inequalities and strengthened the power of local elites 122. This has
resulted in part from insufficient time and resources being devoted to the task of
improving accountability mechanisms and capacity at local levels 123. In addition to the
lack of time and effort spent at fleshing out what could be a strong mechanism for
empowering local communities, adaptation and responses to natural hazards and climatic
changes, also tend to reinforce resource and entitlement inequalities as well as social
hierarchies124. Ultimately the failure of decentralization schemes creates national level
planning that neglects local social, cultural, and environmental realities and increases
vulnerability125.
Where governments have failed due to a lack of competent personnel or
institutional rigidity, or centralization of power and resources, civil society has attempted
to intervene and provide basic public goods as well as a voice for the marginalized and
oppressed. A recent push by civil society actors towards participatory development has
been directed at empowering people by providing them access and representation to
political power structures. Political empowerment and representation are tremendously
important to those who are marginalized in the developing world as many of the things
they are denied relegate them to a lifetime of poverty and vulnerability. This is
particularly true for women who are shut out of what little opportunities are available due
to patriarchal social and political structures. While participatory approaches have been
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heavily criticized, they have experienced success in affecting change at multiple levels of
government126.
While NGOs have attempted to empower local groups in order to improve
democratic participation, the emergence of public private partnerships (PPPs) has negated
some of their gains and increased vulnerability. PPPs have been heavily criticized for
being undemocratic and marginalizing vulnerable groups127. They have also failed to
address the important issues of participation, inclusion, accountability and transparency
in order to build climate resilient institutional capacity. Ultimately, both decentralization
and PPPs are likely to be solutions that governments turn to as they have been utilized in
the past. This is not to say that these solutions could not aid in adaptation; however,
without revisions to their past implementations, they are likely to heighten vulnerability.
In institutionally rigid nations the likelihood of these solutions receiving serious critical
attention in order to maximize their effectiveness is very low.
In the end, ineffective institutions can dramatically worsen the impacts of climate
change. One of the most pressing problems is the diversion of scarce resources either to
mal-adaptations, or to adaptations that do not address urgent priorities or underlying
causes of vulnerability128. This is often the case in states that are driven by an ideology
that fails to critically analyze past solutions to new problems 129.
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Figure 3.5

Underlying Drivers of Vulnerability in Bold

Figure 3.6

Underlying Drivers of Vulnerability in Bold
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Chapter 4: Climate Change Vulnerability and Human Health

Figure 4.1

Source: IPCC, 2007

Climate change is, and will continue to, affect human health through multiple
direct and indirect pathways that intersect with the existing vulnerabilities laid out in the
preceding framework130. Examples of direct impacts include increased extreme weather
events such as heat waves and flooding, while indirect impacts include changes in habitat
conditions for vector and waterborne diseases (malaria & dengue), as well as long
130
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malnutrition due to reductions in crop yields 131. In the long run, the less direct pathways
through which climate change affects human health may prove to be of a greater
magnitude, as they interact with existing vulnerabilities, human activity and
environments132. The problematic nature of indirect pathways is shown in Table 1 as
malnutrition far outstrips other selected health impacts of climate change.

Table 4.1: Estimates for the impact of climate change in 2000 in thousands of DALYs

Source: WHO, 2003

In order to adequately adapt, a nuanced understanding of the causes and effects of
climate change vulnerability including existing vulnerabilities of the poor, need to be
taken into account133. The vulnerability of the poor is particularly important in the case of
infectious disease and malnutrition that feed off of these vulnerabilities, as well as each
other, to exact heavy tolls on the health of poor populations. Diarrheal disease, in
particular, is a leading cause of death in children under-five, and is expected to increase
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as global temperatures rise. While many other diseases produce significant burdens, the
following analysis will demonstrate the significant challenges posed by climate change in
relation to diarrheal disease and its linkage to malnutrition.

Diarrheal Disease and Malnutrition Background
Fecal contamination of human environments is the most important environmental
health issue in the world, responsible for the death of approximately 3 million children
per year134. Diarrheal disease, which results from this contamination, is a symptom of
infection caused by a host of bacterial, viral and parasitic organisms, most of which can
be spread by contaminated water. It spreads from person to person, or to food, through
individuals who do not properly wash their hands after contact with fecal matter. 135.
Some of the main causes of diarrheal disease include a shortage of water and unclean
conditions that spread germs, cause diarrhea, and exacerbate poor nutrition 136.
The resulting disease burden attributable to diarrhea is 1.81 million deaths or
6.9% of all deaths worldwide, making it the 3rd leading cause of death for low income
countries137. From one month to five years of age, diarrhea is the second leading cause of
death worldwide, accounting for 18% of all mortality138. Most children that die from
diarrhea do so as a result of dehydration139. Dehydration results from large losses of
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liquid that develops more quickly in and is most dangerous to small children140. While
dehydration can easily be cured in most developed countries, simple and relatively cheap
treatments such as oral rehydration therapy are lacking in many resource poor settings.
The result is millions of needless deaths that can easily be prevented with simple, cost
effective methods.
To make matters worse, malnutrition synergistically interacts with diarrheal
disease to further aggravate morbidity and mortality. It contributes to more than one third
of all child deaths, as 20 million children under the age of five are severely
malnourished141. Malnourishment leaves them more susceptible to both illness and death,
resulting in the deaths of nearly 10 million children under the age of five each year 142. It
is also linked to diarrhea as it is more common and dangerous in malnourished
individuals143. Repeated or persistent diarrhea also takes a heavy toll on an individual‟s
nutrition as the individual has a tougher time absorbing and utilizing micronutrients144.
Malnutrition, therefore, simultaneously heightens susceptibility to infectious diarrhea,
resulting in a “vicious cycle” that is perpetuated amongst children in developing
countries145. In the presence of grinding poverty around two-thirds of these deaths, that
could be prevented through low-cost interventions such as oral rehydration therapy,
access to adequate water supplies and proper nutrition, continue to occur146.
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Unfortunately, as with diarrheal disease, nearly all the burden of disease associated with
malnutrition is borne by the under-five age group in developing countries147.
This intolerable burden is in danger of increasing. In relation to climate change
the vulnerability associated with diarrheal disease may be aggravated by several impacts
that follow both direct and indirect pathways. These pathways interact with human social,
political, and economic systems increasing vulnerability for populations around the
world. The following analysis assesses the increased threats to human health and
wellbeing this disease poses due to climate change. Ultimately, this analysis will help
yield policies that adequately address the issues that undergird vulnerability to diarrheal
disease and climate change.

Local Environmental Context
Environmental factors heavily impact the incidence and prevalence of diarrheal
disease which is why it is particularly vulnerable to climatic change. They contribute to
around 94% of the 4 billion cases of diarrhea that are estimated to occur every year148.
Many of the conditions that produce higher than average rates of diarrheal disease are
seasonal in nature and peak in warmer months149. Research shows that organisms, many
of which are endemic to developing regions, are highly sensitive to variations in both
temperature and precipitation150. Studies have shown that for every one degree change
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Celsius in air temperature, the incidence of diarrhea can rise by as much as 8% 151. It is
important to note that the effects of increasing temperatures were more marked in winter
months that were typically cool, leading to as high as 12% increases in diarrheal disease
for every one degree change 152. These climatic linkages portend the possibility of
dramatic seasonal rises in diarrhea as winters become milder and average temperatures
continue to increase.
Increased water temperatures also provide ideal conditions for cholera epidemics
which cause significant morbidity and mortality in developing countries 153. In terms of
geographical location, the vulnerability of coastal populations in the developing world
that are exposed to zooplankton which is a reservoir of the cholera-causing organism,
Vibrio cholera is increased. Zooplankton feeds upon phytoplankton, which tends to
increase as ocean temperatures rise154. This indirect pathway nonetheless causes cholera
epidemics that continually ravage the developing world.
Additionally, metabolic rates for other organisms that cause diarrheal disease are
linked to average temperatures, meaning as temperatures rise, growth rates of many
organisms will likely also rise 155. Higher temperatures also increase exposure to bacterial
and parasitic diarrhea, and lengthen survival of bacteria such as E. coli in contaminated
food156. Higher temperatures that contaminate food supplies will likely interact with
reductions in water supplies due to climatic change that lead to reductions in hygienic
151

W. Checkley, and L. Epstein, et al., "Effects of EI Niño and ambient temperature on hospital admissions
for diarrhoeal diseases in Peruvian children," The Lancet 355, no 9202 (2000): 442.
152
Checkley et al., 445-448.
153 Fricas & Martz, 1-5.
154 McMichael et al., 49.
155 McMichael et al., 107.
156 Checkley et al., 445-448.

[- 54 -]

food practices157. This will further augment the prevalence of the organisms that cause
diarrhea in many areas of the world.
Reductions in water supplies are also linked to the seasonality of diarrheal
disease, as its prevalence is linked to precipitation. Seasonal alterations in water supplies
caused by climate change will be heightened in urban areas that are prone to both
flooding and drought. This will greatly compromise hand washing in domestic users that
already receive the smallest allocation of water resources158 and therefore increase
diarrheal rates in dry seasons159. In addition to reductions in supply, flooding caused by
either sea level rise or heavy rainfall events can lead to contaminated water supplies as
sewage networks overflow and cause fecal contamination160. Some of the major causes of
diarrhea linked to contaminated water supplies - Cholera, Cryptosporidium, E.coli,
Giardia, and Shigella - have been associated with heavy rainfall events in many
countries161.
It is important to remember that, though these local environmental factors may
exogenously drive vulnerability to diarrheal disease by creating conditions for these
organisms to thrive, as with all climate change impacts, these factors are still heavily
mediated by macroeconomic, socio-economic, and institutional factors. As the
vulnerability framework described, the availability of water has been reduced by
development of various kinds inducing high levels of water scarcity in many areas. This
activity ultimately affects human health, as adequate amounts of water are needed for
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drinking, cooking, and hygiene. In relation to diarrheal disease, water supplies are of
paramount importance162.

Table 4.2: Relative Risk of Climate Change-attributable Diarrheal Disease in 2030

Source: WHO, 2003

Macroeconomic Context
In macroeconomic terms, vulnerability to diarrheal disease follows a more
complex pathway than local environmental factors, such as temperature and precipitation
changes. However, the implications for macroeconomic instability are no less severe.
Climate change is likely to impact diarrheal disease through its linkages to single sector
economic dependence, reduced agricultural yields and hence malnutrition. The causal
linkages in this chain are far from concrete, as many intervening factors can positively or
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negatively affect the outcome of malnutrition. Regardless of these uncertainties,
malnutrition will increase with reductions in agricultural production 163.
According to the Stern report, declining crop yields could leave hundreds of
millions. Increases in malnutrition, which accounts for an estimated 15% of total
DALYs164, creates the potential for drastic increases in vulnerability to diarrheal disease.
However, the reduction in yields likely to occur due to temperature rise, combined with
recent macroeconomic developments described in the initial framework, will likely
exaggerate the effects of artificial famines, thus increasing overall levels of malnutrition.
This situation will affect subsistence farmers in rural areas as well as the urban poor who
will be unable to afford food at increased prices.
As malnutrition increases due to reductions in agricultural yields, these same
reductions may reduce macroeconomic stability as well as a country‟s ability to provide
public health services to the millions more that face increases in malnutrition and
diarrheal disease. For a 2 degree warming scenario estimates for the increased costs
associated with diarrheal disease and malnutrition range anywhere from $3.333-10.689
million165. The associated decline in global economic output for a 2 degree change has
already been stated as 0-3%166. In terms of macroeconomic stability, reductions in export
revenue due to reductions in crop yields will help feed a cycle of diminishing health
quality in many developing countries.
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In addition to macroeconomic instability, the potentially negative effects on
income for the urban poor in nations that are heavily reliant on single economic sectors
reliant on climatic factors will be aggravated by reductions in aggregate demand for
labor, due to the resulting macroeconomic downturn. Reductions in economic
opportunity will lead to lowered household incomes and a further inability to purchase
health care or adequate amounts of food, resulting in significant levels of food poverty
and malnutrition that will aggravate vulnerability to diarrheal disease 167. As governments
have already been forced to reduce spending on these vitally important programs due to
SAP budget constraints, further reductions in household income will be extremely
harmful.

Table 4.3: Relative Risk of Climate Change-attributable Malnutrition in 2030

Source: WHO, 2003
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Socio-economic Context
The stress macroeconomic instability will place on national, as well as on
household level income, will overwhelmingly affect the poor. Research shows that in the
developing world, poor populations already shoulder the majority of the burden of
infectious disease; the same is true for diarrheal disease 168. To put the disease burden in
perspective, it is not present in the top ten killers of either middle or high income
populations and yet still constitutes 3.7% of global deaths 169. Without causing significant
mortality in middle or high income countries diarrhea is still the 5 th most lethal killer
worldwide170. The vulnerability due to poverty alone is staggering and is a significant
driver of vulnerability in the socio-economic context.
Poverty can lead to a myriad of problems that exacerbate vulnerability to diarrheal
disease and climate change in urban settings. These problems largely stem from
conditions that create an environment that breeds infectious disease. Poverty feeds this
environment by increasing migration, lowering nutrition levels, increasing population
densities, and reducing a population‟s access to water and sanitation infrastructure171. In
addition to a lack of basic public goods, slum are often located in areas prone to flooding
events that increase levels of diarrheal disease, and are expected to increase with climate
change.
In many countries becoming sick can be a death sentence as monetary resources
are simply not available for medical care. This situation is far worse in highly unequal
168
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societies as the poor are already vulnerable to climatic factors that influence diarrheal
disease due to the lack of public resources they receive. This results in exactly the
conditions that benefit the spread of diarrheal disease, namely a lack of water and
sanitation infrastructure as well as a lack of general education concerning hygiene. This is
particularly important for diarrheal disease as around 88% of diarrheal disease is
attributed to unsafe water supply, inadequate sanitation and hygiene 172.
It has been demonstrated that increasing inequality within a population heightens
collective vulnerability, and is associated with a reduction in the provision of public
goods173. This is due to fact that wealthy segments of society rarely make decisions that
benefit society as a whole 174. Ironically, the vulnerability of the poor to infectious disease
may jeopardize the well-being of more economically advantaged members of society
through spillover effects and the opportunity cost of public services committed to dealing
with problems related to the disadvantage175. Regardless of this fact, it has been shown
that the privileged in society have rarely acknowledged these potential spillover effects,
let alone enacted policies to improve the health of the poor even out of self motivation,
which has left the poor far more vulnerable to diarrheal disease.
Inequality also lays the groundwork for climate induced migration by creating
unstable rural livelihoods. Rural to urban migration will likely lead to an increased
prevalence of diarrheal disease as high population densities aggravate the fact that human

172

Water Sanitation and Hygiene Fact Sheet, 1-2.
P. Kelly and Neil Adger, "Theory and Practice in Assessing Vulnerability to Climate Change And
Facilitating Adaptation," Climatic Change 47, no 4 (2000): 330.
174
Todaro, 209-273.
175
McMichael et al., 14.
173

[- 60 -]

migrations have been a main driver of epidemics throughout history176. In addition to
increasing disease prevalence, these migrants will likely further reduce marginal
employment opportunities as the labor pool grows in the absence of changes in demand.
This will increase large scale inequalities in income distribution, ultimately reducing the
ability of the poor to pay for their own wellbeing.
Ultimately, this situation disproportionately affects specific demographic groups,
namely children. Currently, a child born in the developing world is 13 times as likely to
die within the first five years of life compared to a child in the industrialized world 177.
Climate change will dramatically aggravate this situation as most current research points
to the fact that the additional burden of disease associated with climate change will be
borne by children in developing countries 178.

Institutional Context
In an ideal world, government and civil society institutions would act to reduce
this vulnerability; however, high levels of inequality and a lack of human capital have
been shown to actually drive it. In reference to diarrheal disease and climate change,
public goods have been shown to be essential for decreasing vulnerability. As Dr Lee
Jong-Wook former director general of the WHO put it, “Water and Sanitation is one of
the primary drivers of public health. I often refer to it as „Health 101‟, which means that
once we can secure access to clean water and to adequate sanitation facilities for all
176
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people, irrespective of the difference in their living conditions, a huge battle against all
kinds of diseases will be won.”179
In fact an improved water supply reduces morbidity by anywhere from 6%-25%,
while improved sanitation reduces it by as much as 32% 180. In addition to these
infrastructural factors, hygiene and disease education is also vital to prevent transmission
and infection. Hygiene interventions, including hygiene education and promotion of hand
washing can lead to a 45% reduction in incidence rates181. Combined with proper
nutrition, these factors could prevent the majority of diarrheal disease 182. Unfortunately,
many in the developed world lack these basic measures thereby greatly increasing their
vulnerability to diarrheal disease.
Despite the ability of these public goods to greatly reduce morbidity and
mortality, as of 2002 17 % of the global population, or 1.1 billion people, lacked access
to improved water sources183. Of the 1.1 billion without improved water sources, nearly
two thirds lived in Asia184. In addition, 42% or 2.6 billion people, lacked access to
improved sanitation185. The result is that in some of the most heavily affected areas,
namely Southeast Asia (8.5%) and Africa (7.7%), diarrheal disease is responsible for a
considerable percentage of overall mortality186. In urban settings, fecal contamination in
sewage, septic tanks and latrines is a particular problem for the poor187. In the absence of
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proper sanitation and water treatment facilities, the use of personal hygiene measures is
vital for disease prevention188. However, these same populations also lack education and
health services, further rendering them vulnerable to diarrheal disease.
Climate change will increase this vulnerability by damaging the physical
infrastructure of the water delivery and sanitation systems that do exist in the developing
world. This will occur through the erosion of pipelines as a result of heavy rainfall and
flooding events189. Sewer outfalls, which usually empty into rivers or the sea, as well as
sewage treatment works, are also at risk of damage during floods190. The effects on
sewage systems is of vital importance as they are the main determinant of the
contamination of urban flood water with fecal material, which presents a substantial
threat of enteric disease191. This will tax the resources of institutions already struggling to
provide these vital services to their populations, as they are forced to pay for repairs and
the “climate proofing” of existing infrastructure.
Despite the billions who lack access to these essential services, in all regions of
the world, except notably sub-Saharan Africa, most countries have made significant
strides towards meeting their MDG of reducing under-five child mortality. However,
efforts towards increasing access to water and sanitation have been slow, which is of
particular concern in relation to climate change. Much of the failure to rapidly extend
these services to all citizens stems from institutional rigidity and a lack of resources. As
the effects on sanitation networks show, increased funding requirements will be
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mandatory for climate proofing existing infrastructure as well as creating new water and
sanitation infrastructure to avoid increased deaths due to diarrheal disease. At present
rates it is highly doubtful that many of the poorer nations in the world will be able to
secure funding to do so. Coupled with the pervasive macroeconomic effects in reduction
of export earnings, existing funding sources are likely to greatly diminish.
Unfortunately, NGOs are unlikely to step in and provide these services as water
and sanitation infrastructure can be very expensive. Many NGOs do provide water
purification methods, dig wells, and provide latrines of various forms; however, much of
this activity is in a piecemeal fashion that does not currently take into account the many
effects associated with climate change that are likely to occur. For example, NGOs in
many countries are primarily located in rural areas despite the global trends towards
urbanization. While some of this activity is meant to strengthen rural livelihoods and
stem the tide of urban migrants, much of it simply reflects the whims of distant donors
who are not attuned to many of the serious causes and consequences of vulnerability in
the developing world. The lack of planning and coherence is not the fault of civil society,
as it is simply a collection of actors that lack a single unifying body. What this signals is
the vital importance of governments in the institutional context for achieving
vulnerability reduction at the needed scale. Ultimately, governments will need to be able
to perform a variety of functions in addition to increasing monetary resources. These
include increasing human capital, national stability, and institutional flexibility.
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A final note for the institutional context is that many of the successes in control of
infectious diseases, such as smallpox and polio, have been due to global commitment192.
The likely reduction in national resources and increased burden due to climate change
will create a certain level of dependency for many developing nations on resources
coming from neighboring countries or the international community. Again, institutional
flexibility and human capital will prove vital in order to secure outside aid through treaty
negotiations or other means as the scope of these problems will be much larger than the
domestic resources of individual nations.
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Chapter 5: Bangladesh
The case study chosen for this paper is Bangladesh as it has been one of the first
countries to initiate the NAPA process and move forward with adaptation at a national
level. It also suffers from a high incidence of diarrheal disease in the under-five
population, which results from a variety of factors related to the vulnerability framework.
The country‟s vulnerability is driven by a confluence of climatic impacts related to the
local environmental context including seasonal distribution of water supplies, flooding,
sea level rise and extreme weather activity. However, its vulnerability is increased by
macroeconomic, socio-economic, and institutional factors that magnify the vulnerabilities
created by its local environment.
The climate change scenario utilized for this paper corresponds to the lower
bound of the IPCC scenarios where carbon dioxide emissions are stabilized between 550600ppm, with global temperature increases of 2 degrees Celsius and sea level rise of .3
meters193. Migration for this scenario has also been estimated at between 5-10% along
existing routes194. This scenario roughly corresponds to the most optimistic IPCC
scenario, B1. It follows a story line that allows for a rapid change towards a service and
information economy that reduces material intensity and introduces clean and efficient
technologies on a large scale. These innovations allow for sweeping changes that are
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highly unlikely in light of the limited progress made in both international treaty
negotiations, and the decrease in either material intensity or emissions in the global
economy195. Despite its highly improbable nature, this scenario was chosen because it
serves to highlight that even at the very low end of climate change impacts, traditional
public health sector responses are inadequate as an adaptation response to climate
change. Therefore holistic adaptation policies that recognize and assess these impacts
according to the vulnerability framework are needed in order to adequately respond to
heightened levels of vulnerability.

Diarrheal Disease Burden and Malnutrition Complications for Under-five
Mortality
Bangladesh faces many difficult challenges in achieving positive developmental
outcomes, which will be clearly laid out in the following sections. In spite of the many
challenges the country faces, it has made laudable progress in reducing under-five
mortality (a 54%196 reduction as of 2005), which has placed it well on the way towards
achieving its MDG reduction of 66%197. Unfortunately, the country still suffers from an
under-five mortality rate of 77 per 1,000 live births, placing it above the South Asian
regional mortality rate of 66 198. Diarrheal disease accounts for nearly 20% of this
mortality in Bangladesh, ranking second only to neonatal causes 199. In comparison to
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other South Asian countries, it has the fifth highest percentage of under-five mortality
due to diarrheal disease, though it is only 1.9% greater than the regional high200.
In addition to this large burden, complications posed by malnutrition are
immense. Malnutrition is a societal problem that afflicts over 40% of the population, who
consume less than the absolute minimum caloric intake per day201. It accounts for over
half of under-five mortality and significantly increases morbidity and mortality due to
diarrheal disease. As of 2005, Bangladesh had reduced the percentage of underweight
children to 51% from a baseline of 67%, as well as the percentage of severely
underweight children to 13% from 25%202. Despite this success, the proportion of
underweight children is still 16% higher than the majority of Asian nations at similar
levels of economic development 203. Child malnutrition is pervasive and particularly
pronounced amongst the poor; more than 60% of children suffering from stunting belong
to the poorest levels of society204. The existing burden of diarrheal disease and the
complications posed by widespread malnutrition are already being affected by climate
change as the global disease burden of climate-change attributable diarrheal disease and
malnutrition are the largest in Bangladesh205. The situation the country faces undoubtedly
warrants a focus on adaptation policies in order to avoid serious setbacks in the progress
it has made.
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South Asia Regional Context
It is useful to begin by briefly describing the regional setting in which Bangladesh
finds itself in relation to the vulnerability drivers and climate change. As the linkages
between the vulnerability framework, climate change, and diarrheal disease have been
elucidated, this section will describe the most prominently related trends that are
occurring in South Asia. The most relevant regional aspects that are driving existing
vulnerability are population growth, urbanization, land use changes, and reductions in
fresh water supply. The linkages between these existing vulnerabilities and the exposure
to climate change impacts have been shown to increase vulnerability to diarrheal disease
which is likely to be a significant challenge for the region.
As of 2002, the total reported population in Asia was 3.9 billion206. A year prior,
the Asia/Pacific region reported the largest percentage, 24.7%, of the world‟s urban
population207. While many attribute increased populations to the astronomical growth
rates of large urban centers in China, much of the soaring rates of urbanization can be
attributed to other countries in the South Asia region including Nepal, Bangladesh,
Bhutan and Pakistan, all of which displayed urban growth rates higher than China‟s
between 1970 and 1995208.
The region is one of the most densely populated in the world, with much of the
population density found in urban areas. The current rural to urban population ratio is
3:1209. This population density is striking considering that more than 1/5th of the world‟s
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inhabitants are crammed into only 3.3% of the earth‟s land 210. The enormous levels of
population growth and urbanization are demonstrated by the fact that the South Asian
sub-region contains seven of the world‟s 10 most populous countries - China, India,
Pakistan, and Bangladesh - as well as 5 of the world‟s 20 megacities211. Despite the
burden that these large populations place upon both natural and fiscal resources,
population growth in Asia will continue to rapidly grow in coming decades. The majority
of the region‟s population growth is forecasted to come from South Asia where 570
million people will be added in India, 200 million in Pakistan and 130 million in
Bangladesh over the next 50 years212.
While urbanization has grown in tandem with rising populations, rural to urban
migration has helped to fuel much of this rapid growth due to a variety of push, as well as
pull, factors. Currently, 64% of urban growth is created by migration213. These population
movements are linked to pressure on natural resources and the environment arising from
agricultural and industrial development that weaken the opportunity for sustainable rural
livelihoods214. Much of this development pressure comes from burgeoning urban
populations that stimulate demands for goods and services 215. This situation has created a
self-reinforcing cycle, as demand for goods and resources from urban centers drives
pressures on natural resources that undermine rural livelihoods, thus inducing migration
that further grows urban populations and stimulates demand.
210
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This vulnerability is complicated by a regional trend towards reductions in fresh
water supply that is needed to combat the spread of diarrheal disease. Existing levels of
demand placed upon water resources have decreased water availability per capita by
almost 70% since 1950, placing the region in serious danger of physical or economic
scarcity of this precious resource by 2025 216. India, Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh have
all experienced water shortages that are linked to rapid urbanization, population growth
and inefficient water use217. The resulting precipitous decline in freshwater resources is
shown by the fact that per capita water availability in South Asia has fallen from 21,000
cubic meters in 1960, to 8,000 in 2005 218. Water stress is defined as less than 1,700
annual cubic meters of fresh water per capita, while water scarcity is experienced below
1,000 cubic meters219. The reductions experienced throughout the region place them on a
treacherous path towards these levels. In fact, a decrease in freshwater availability
throughout Asia, along with population growth and rising standards of living, will
significantly affect the livelihoods of up to 1.2 billion people who will be exposed to
water stress in coming years220.
The combination of domestic, industrial, and agricultural demand due to
population growth, urbanization and economic development are the driving forces behind
increasing levels of water stress in South Asia. Agriculture is the largest culprit as it
places the highest level of demand on water resources and is the single largest contributor
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to South Asian economies221. Weak governmental institutions responsible for regulating
water supplies have provided industrial and agricultural users free range to exploit water
resources as they see fit. The most important regional impacts related to climate change
and freshwater availability, are therefore inextricably linked to the forces of land use
intensification for agriculture, industrialization and urbanization222. The linkages between
these various forces tend to feed each other and further increase vulnerability. For
example, increasing demand for food and soaring levels of economic development will
reduce the amount of adequate arable land for agriculture needed to sustain rural
livelihoods as well as feed ever expanding urban populations 223.
Additional stresses to water supplies created by climate change will arise as a
result of seasonal changes in rainfall and glacier melt. Rainfall is already seasonal in
nature, as it is primarily driven by the Southwest summer, and Northeast winter,
monsoons224. Climate change has been shown to increasingly allocate water towards the
wetter months, rendering the drier months even more drought prone. Water availability is
already drastically reduced during the dry season which accounts for only 10-30% of
rainfall225. In addition, nearly 80% of the dry season flow of the Indus, Ganges and
Brahmaputra Rivers, which comes from Himalayan glaciers located on the Tibetan
Plateau, has receded in recent decades226. Alterations in dry season water supply as
rainfall and glacier melt decreases, combined with surges in water demand resulting from
221
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development activity, will have the greatest impact on the agricultural sector as it is the
most sensitive sector, to climate change induced-impacts in the region227.
Reductions in water supplies due to climate change will likely lower water
availability in urban areas as agricultural users divert more and more of a dwindling
resource. The result will be a diversion of scarce resources away from domestic purposes
in favor of more economically productive uses such as agriculture. The situation is
worsened by public utilities unable to deliver water services or collect payment for them
in urban areas, resulting in low levels of investment in infrastructure and maintenance 228.
As the conditions that favor the spread and generation of diarrheal causing organisms
increase due to climate change, reductions in water supplies will prove particularly
harmful for communities that lack access to sanitation networks. This situation will likely
have significant impacts on diarrheal disease, which taken in tandem with increases in
malnutrition rates due to reductions in agricultural yield, will greatly increase the spread
of diarrheal disease. The result is a dangerous combination for a region already suffering
high rates of diarrheal disease, malnutrition and under-five mortality.
At the other end of the spectrum, the seasonal allocation of water during the rainy
or wet months is likely to significantly increase; the region is already prone to large scale
flooding that has risen greatly in recent years. Bangladesh, Nepal and the north-east states
of India all experienced extreme rainfall events during 2002, 2003 and 2004 that resulted
in unprecedented levels of flooding 229.
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The effects of a skewed seasonal distribution of water are even worse for coastal
communities. It will prove particularly damaging to heavily populated delta and mega
delta regions in South, East, and South-East Asia that are at the greatest risk of sea and
river flooding230. It will increase the flood risk from anywhere from 13 to 94 million
people, with almost 60% of this increase spanning the coast from Pakistan to Burma 231.
One of the most significant repercussions in terms of salinization of water
supplies caused by rising sea levels is back water effect (BWE). BWE refers to “the
retardation of a river outflow by a rise in the level of water at the mouth of the river” 232.
This can cause a flow reversal as water moves back upstream from the mouth of a river
emptying into the sea233. Saltwater from the Bay of Bengal is reported to have penetrated
100 km or more inland along tributary channels during the dry season 234. This effect
combined with declining river runoff will seriously affect fresh water supplies and hence
diarrheal rates235.
Unfortunately, these vulnerabilities intersect with patterns of human settlement
that are drastically reducing mangrove forests in the region. The loss of these coastal
ecosystems and the host of benefits they have for local communities will place around
one million people along the coasts of South and South-East Asia at a heightened risk of
flooding236. In addition to flooding risk, extreme weather events are endemic to South
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Asia and are predicted to magnify in intensity in coming years. This is evidenced by
cyclone activity originating from the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea, which is occurring
less frequently but with higher intensity since 1970237.
While all of these pathways will lead to increases in morbidity and mortality, the
convergence of reductions in water supplies, increases in temperature and flooding, as
well as extreme weather events that threaten sewage infrastructure create very strong
risks of increasing burdens of diarrheal disease. In the case of sewage infrastructure, the
potential risk posed by rising sea levels is aggravated by coastal development and
reductions in wetlands that exacerbate a process of erosion that is endangering coastal
water and sanitation infrastructure as shorelines retreat. This is compounded by the fact
that climatic changes leading to conditions and habitats that are favorable to both vector
and waterborne diseases have been highlighted as important problems for the region as
the case of coastal water temperature leading to increases in the abundance and toxicity
of cholera clearly demonstrates. This will lead to increases in vulnerability as the current
global burden of climate-change attributable diarrhea and malnutrition are already the
largest in the South and Southeast Asian countries of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India,
Maldives, Myanmar and Nepal in 2000 238.
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Bangladesh Local Environmental Context
While social, political, and economic factors all drive vulnerability to climate
change, when analyzing Bangladesh it is difficult to ignore the paramount role the local
environmental context plays in exogenously creating this vulnerability. Geographic,
topographic, and local weather conditions all drive the unusually high vulnerability the
country exhibits to both climate events and processes. This vulnerability is derived from
the awe-inspiring wrath of nature‟s often violent fury, occurring at the nexus of two
dynamic environments: a giant delta that contains the world‟s largest coastal mangrove
forest, the Sundarbans; and the mighty Himalayan plateau. The result is a paradox of a
simultaneously life-sustaining, and life-threatening, monsoon cycle that wreaks havoc on
what is, for all intents and purposes, a densely populated floodplain ravaged by high
cyclonic activity.
Despite more than half the country being located north of the Tropics, the climate
is characterized by high temperatures and excessive humidity, creating a tropical climate
throughout the year. The environment to the north of the country provides life sustaining
water derived from seasonal glacial melt from the Himalayan plateau as well as the
annual monsoons. This water is transported to the country via three major rivers: the
Ganges, the Brahmaputra, and the Meghna (GBM). The majority of the flow of these
tremendous rivers originates in foreign countries and finds an outlet to the sea in the Bay
of Bengal. Much of the land along the riverbanks, including vast flood plains, is made up
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of highly fertile alluvial soil, which is undergoing a constant process of erosion and
accretion as the rivers ebb and flow with the seasons 239.

Figure 5.2

Source: Ali, 1999
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The powerful swings of the monsoonal pendulum move the country from
abundant rainfall and flooding, to water-scarce conditions and drought. Despite having an
annual per capita endowment of fresh water amongst the top in the world, severe
droughts have hit the country 11 times over the past half century, affecting nearly 50% of
the country240. The regular occurrence of drought is often due to the failure of the
seasonal monsoons, which is aggravated by wide seasonal variations in water runoff
ratios between the dry and wet seasons as high as 1:6241.

The situation is further

exacerbated by the overuse of groundwater supplies that have increased as a percentage
of land from nearly zero in 1960, to 70% as of 1999242. While this irrigation has been a
large driver in achieving food security, the over-extraction of underground aquifers has
dramatically decreased both the quantity and quality of fresh water supplies.
At the other end of pendulum, flooding annually affects about 20% of land; in
extreme cases, like in 1987, 1988, and 1998, this figure is as high as 70% 243. There are
four distinct types of flooding that affect Bangladesh: flash floods, rain induced floods,
monsoonal floods and coastal floods 244. These flood events are aided by the topography
of the country that is primarily a floodplain (80%), with altitudes ranging no more than
13 meters above sea level245. In fact 10% of the country is hardly one meter above sea
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level while another one third continually faces tidal incursions 246. As a result of these
conditions the effects of all four forms of flood events are dramatically increased.
Of all flood events, monsoon floods that occur in the flood plains of the major
rivers between June and September cause the most damage 247. The floods of 1987, 1988
and 1998 were all monsoonal and due mainly to runoff from cross-border basin areas of
the GBM system248. To give an idea of how devastating these floods were, the 1988
floods inundated 61% of the country, causing an estimated 2,000-6,500 deaths, $1.2
billion in damages and leaving more than 45 million homeless, while the 1998 floods
caused an estimated 1,100 deaths, $2.8 billion in damage and left 30 million people
homeless249. This destruction is a combination of a variety of factors, including snow and
glacier melt, El-Nino induced conditions, a loss of drainage capacity due to the siltation
of principal

distributaries,

backwater

effect

(BWE),

unplanned

deforestation, and the synchronization of flood peaks of the major rivers 250.
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urbanization,

Figure 5.3

Source: CEGIS, Dhaka
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Figure 5.4

While many of these factors are linked to environmental degradation,
deforestation is the most apparent. It has resulted in a 50% reduction in forest cover
during the last 20 years, adding to the environmental stress of flood events as topsoil is
lost and land is eroded. Bangladesh has a classified natural forest area of about 10%,
however only 6-8% of this is vegetative cover capable of mitigating flood events. Despite
the efforts of afforestation programs, progress in reducing vulnerability has been
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limited251. The major causes of deforestation are industrialization, rapid urbanization, and
high population pressure on existing forestland, both for settlement and agriculture 252.
Another contributing factor to the damage caused by floods is BWE. BWE is
created by the congruence of freshwater carried by the GBM river system, and the
intrusion of seawater from the coast. The effect causes saline seawater to enter the
mainland through the rivers, adversely affecting agriculture, sweet-water shrimp
cultivation, and the availability of potable water for domestic use. BWE causes
floodwater inside the country to accumulate, causing severe inundation and further
aggravation of existing flood situations 253. The effect is particularly pronounced in the
Meghna River estuary, which accounts for 90% of the water that discharges into the Bay
of Bengal254. It is important to note that BWE also affects drought situations during the
dry season, when salinity penetrates further and deeper into the mainland, reducing
freshwater supplies.
While the existing patterns of flooding and drought associated with the
monsoonal cycle cause colossal damage to Bangladeshi society, alterations to this cycle
that have been reported frequently in recent decades portend dire consequences.
According to the Bangladesh Water Development Board, the severity of floods have
become more frequent during the past 50 years, with at least 7 big floods affecting about
35-70% of the land area255. In addition, three out of five very high intensity floods of the
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past century have occurred during the past three decades 256. As recently as 2004 and 2007
flooding occurred that was comparable, in terms of flow, to the 1998 and 1988 mega
floods. The central and northeastern areas of the country are extremely vulnerable to
these events and suffer greatly during the peak discharge of the Brahmaputra and Meghna
rivers257. The vulnerability of these populations will be increasingly exacerbated as
floodplain populations continue to increase258.
While much of the rise in damage associated with flooding events is due to
improvement increases in human settlement in flood-prone areas, 259 climatic change is
undoubtedly playing a significant role. In Bangladesh, average temperature has registered
an increasing trend of about 1°C in May and 0.5°C in November during the 14 year
period from 1985 to 1998260. In addition to rising temperatures, the annual mean rainfall
has increased with decadal rain anomalies above long term averages since the 1960s
resulting in serious and recurring flooding events in 2002, 2003, and 2004. Glacial melt
occurs at the same time as the summer monsoon, meaning that the intensification of
seasonal monsoon rain events will cause large scale flooding placing the country at a
heightened risk of flood disasters similar to those experienced in 1987, 1988, and 1998261.
Climatic changes in Bangladesh will likely reflect the increasing intensity of
existing environmental conditions that lead to severe weather events and seasonal water
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inequities. The major challenges the country will face in relation to diarrheal disease and
malnutrition include: a scarcity of fresh water due to less rain and higher evapotranspiration in the dry season as well as increasing salinization of surface water, flooding
due to drainage congestion, heavy monsoon precipitation and rising sea levels, and
prolonged and widespread drought 262. These challenges will be dictated by the seasonal
monsoon pattern. During the monsoon (wet) season, increased rainfall will lead to
worsened drainage congestion, water logging and ultimately widespread flooding 263. This
will primarily be due to differences in timing of water flow. Increasingly, the country will
see more of its annual flow during the wet season as glaciers melt faster. On the other
hand, the dry season will experience a drastic reduction in trans-boundary surface water
inflows264.
A significant mediating factor in this seasonal water availability is the fact that
neighboring countries control 92% of Bangladeshis‟ surface water arriving through the
GBM system265. As Bangladesh is heavily reliant on surface water runoff from the
Himalayan plateau, the country is vulnerable to water diversions by upstream neighbors.
One of the most important of these is the Farakka Barrage, which has had a particularly
devastating effect on South-Western Bangladesh as India has unilaterally diverted the
river since 1975 to ensure water supplies for energy production and agriculture. These
diversions affect around 35 million people who depend upon the Ganges river basin for
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their water needs266. In the Barguna district alone, as a result of disruptions to agricultural
and industrial production, as well as domestic water supplies, 50% are now landless 267.
The resulting increases in water and soil salinity, due to reduced dry season flows
caused by excessive upstream withdrawals in India, will likely intensify as river flows
change due to melting glaciers and variations in precipitation268. This increased stress is
added to a situation that has already forced the migration of thousands of rural farmers,
many of them to India. Despite the creation of a Joint Rivers Commission and Ganges
Water Agreement in the 1970s the situation between the countries is still extremely tense.
Climate change is likely to aggravate this situation immensely as Bangladesh and India
have been identified as countries where increased stresses on water supplies create a high
risk of violent conflict 269.
In addition to the wide array of problems surrounding its water supplies,
Bangladesh is extremely susceptible to tropical cyclones originating in the Bay of
Bengal. The destruction these storms cause is highlighted by the fact that although only
1% of global cyclones strike Bangladesh annually, yet they experience fatalities that
account for 53% of the world total270. Much of the death and destruction is caused by
storm surges that can reach as high as 10 meters271.
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Unfortunately, the cyclones originating from the Bay of Bengal have shown
increasing intensity since 1970 despite a decrease in frequency 272. In addition, it is
estimated that the increased likelihood of cyclones making landfall will be 32% with
increased storm surge heights of 21%273. As these cyclonic impacts increase, coastal
communities will increasingly come into contact with the overwhelmingly destructive
forces originating in the Bay of Bengal and the adjoining North Indian Ocean and face
increased impetus for migration274. In addition to the implications for migration caused
by increased cyclonic activity, more intense storm surges may inundate low-lying coastal
deltas and cause reductions in freshwater stores due to saline contamination 275.
In spite of its overwhelming vulnerability to cyclonic activity, the country has
been blessed with the natural protection of the Sundarbans, the world‟s largest mangrove
forest. This forest provides vital protection from tropical cyclones and storm surges.
Unfortunately, Bangladesh has been tearing down this protective wall rapidly in recent
years, highlighted by the losses experienced in the Sal forest of 83%276. This drastic
reduction in mangrove forest is largely attributed to the creation of human settlements
and economic activity that now places coastal communities in even more severe danger
as climate change increases the wind speed and storm surge of cyclones that make
landfall277.
Owing to the fact that the vast majority of the country barely rises above sea level,
the effects of cyclonic activity will coincide with sea level rise to cause high levels of
272

Climate Change and Bangladesh, 9.
Ali, 1996, 172-179.
274
Ali, 1996, 171.
275
Jaitly, 20-21.
276
Bangladesh State of the Environment, 17-18.
277
Mirza et al., 2005, 231-252.
273

[- 86 -]

damage. For a 2 degree temperature change, sea level rise in Bangladesh has been
estimated at .3 meters278. This rise will lead to saltwater intrusion in coastal aquifers that
will decrease water supplies for both agricultural and domestic purposes. In addition to
the destruction of crops, inundation of cities, and direct effects on morbidity and
mortality, these impacts will hasten the existing destruction of sources of natural
protection, such as mangrove forests as saltwater intrusion destroys fresh water access for
these forests279. The resulting vulnerability of coastal areas will be acute due to the
combined effects of climate change, loss of protective mangroves, and upstream water
diversion by neighboring countries280.
Ultimately, the climatic impacts that lead directly or indirectly to flooding and
drought will influence diarrheal disease outbreaks as they interact with higher surface
temperatures281. Cholera epidemics are an example of the confluence of these climatic
linkages that are endemic to Bangladesh and demonstrate a distinct seasonal fluctuation
that is mostly attributable to environmental factors282. They begin in the char islands at
the end of the monsoon season and are linked to zooplankton blooms that provide
excellent habitats for their survival283. The seasonality of Cholera as well as other
diarrhea causing organisms will be greatly affected by temperature increases that have
already been higher in colder months when temperature increases most greatly affect
diarrheal disease. Cholera along with a variety of diarrheal diseases caused by Giardia,
278
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Salmonella and Cryptosporidium will contaminate drinking water in these coastal
locations as the conditions in which they thrive increase284. Climate change will also add
to the environmental health risk associated with diarrheal disease that is already
increasing rapidly as a result of industrial growth and urbanization 285. However, it is
impossible to disaggregate the increases in morbidity and mortality due to climatic
factors from inextricable linkages to socio-economic factors of poverty, hygiene
behavior, and a lack of access to water and sanitation infrastructure286.
Environmental factors that are directly linked to diarrheal disease are obviously of
tremendous concern to adaptation policymakers in reducing under-five mortality.
However, many of the vulnerabilities to climate change are indirect in their relation to
diarrheal disease and malnutrition. These indirect risks can cause societal upheavals or
shocks that can decrease both macroeconomic and institutional stability. These risks are
arguably just as important as they will decrease the country‟s ability to react and adapt to
increasing levels of diarrheal disease and malnutrition that climate change creates.

Bangladesh Macroeconomic Context
While the country is subject to high levels of vulnerability due to its environment,
one of the factors that helps to mediate this vulnerability for developed countries - high
levels of diversified economic development that are relatively equally distributed
throughout society - is all but absent in Bangladesh. The result is a desperately poor
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country whose wealth is unequally distributed. In macroeconomic terms, much of this
vulnerability is due to the fact that it is a predominantly rural economy that is relatively
undiversified287. This has led to a heavy reliance on an agricultural system that is at the
mercy of nature and increasingly high levels of climatic change.
In spite of its reliance on agriculture, the country has not followed the path of
many developing countries in becoming reliant on the export of agricultural commodities.
For better or worse the country has turned towards manufacturing - a particularly notable
amount of activity is devoted to the ready made garment industry - to take advantage of
its low cost of labor and spur economic development. As a result, 46% of the $67.69
billion in current GDP is created from manufacturing 288. Much of this activity takes place
in the services sector, accountable for the bulk of economic output at 53% of GDP 289.
This production has helped the country to reduce its direct reliance on agriculture to
19%290.
The shift away from agricultural production as a primary component of GDP has,
however, followed international economic trends stemming from neo-liberal policies.
From 1971-1976 the country heavily regulated and nationalized many productive
industries; along with much of the developing world this was followed by an era of
reduced state control and trade liberalization291. Starting in the early 1990s the country
substantially reduced its tariffs and allowed for conversion of its current account. Much
of this trade reform is linked to the readymade garment industry that accounts for 75% of
287
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merchandising exports, and is linked to broader attempts to achieve economic
development via integration into the international trading system292. This has not,
however, helped to diversify the country‟s geographic distribution of economic activity
as more than 80% of the garment industries are located in Dhaka 293. The high
concentration of readymade garment exports in relation to the country‟s economy as a
whole, renders it extremely vulnerable to external shocks 294.
Such

shocks would

have significant

repercussions

for

the country‟s

macroeconomic stability. Despite a steadily declining external debt servicing ratio (debt
service as a % of export earnings) that fell from 15.8% in 1992 to 6.5% in 2003, the
country‟s external debt actually rose from $13.3 billion to $17 billion295. Therefore the
declining debt service ratio was actually attributable to increased exports and economic
growth, rather than decreased external debts. This increased level of debt could prove to
be a significant problem as reductions of 0-3% of GDP will make it extremely difficult
for the country to continue to service this debt through the sale of exports. A potential
negative feedback loop is also the reductions in state revenue that would further hamper
economic development. In fact a survey of 1,000 firms in Dhaka and Chittagong found
that the factor that most significantly constrained their operations behind corruption was
the country‟s lack of infrastructure296. In order to avoid further complications of this
tenuous situation the capital account convertibility restrictions the country has maintained
are extremely important. Without such restrictions, attacks on the currency can weaken it
292
293

www.worldbank.org
“Dhaka, Bangladesh Disaster Risk Management Profile,” 3CD City Profile Series, www.emi.pdc.org.

11.
294

P. Patel et al. “Bangladesh Growth and Export Competitiveness,” (World Bank, 2005), 28-31.
Bangladesh Growth and Export Competitiveness, 21-28.
296
Bangladesh Growth and Export Competitiveness, 21-28.
295

[- 90 -]

in relation to foreign currencies in which its debt is held. Such attacks pose the potential
for future balance of payments crises and currency devaluations that was a large
contributor to the financial crisis that swept Southeast Asia in the late 1990‟s 297.
Relinquishing this measure of control can have important repercussions for
macroeconomic stability, forcing reductions in state spending on public goods.
Capital account convertibility restrictions are one of several integral components
of economic development policies that are vitally important for developing countries in
order to retain macroeconomic stability. Export and import tariffs are also important as
they provide developing countries with revenue generation and industry protection298.
Bangladesh has retained an escalating tariff structure that protects domestic producers in
many industries and provides desperately needed national revenue299. These measures
provide the country with a modicum of stability that currently developed countries have
utilized to achieve their own economic development in the modern era.

In fact,

developed countries have largely ignored laissez-faire policy strictures and retained
control over their macroeconomic environment. They have done so in order to protect
domestic industries and limit exposure to unstable international economic environments
and the power inequities involved in developed/undeveloped country trade relations300.
In spite of retaining these important economic controls, the economy is still
vulnerable due to high levels of single sector economic dependence. This is due to the
fact that both manufacturing and services are still very much reliant on stable levels of
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agricultural production either for processing of agricultural products, or for servicing both
key sectors of the economy301. In fact, despite the majority of GDP being generated by
the service sector, nearly 2/3 of Bangladeshis are employed in agriculture with rice being
the single most important product302. In the early 1990s the country achieved selfsufficiency in cereal production mainly due to rice, the main staple of the Bangladeshi
diet303. However, increases in total yields were due largely to the mechanization of
agriculture, with an emphasis on particular varieties of high-yield crops that resulted in
the loss of many traditional varieties of rice. In addition, the practice of monocropping
has caused the deterioration of soil fertility and an overall decline in productivity, despite
the rise in total production due to the increasing levels of agricultural activity 304. This
renders the sustainability of current levels of total cereal production questionable, as they
are heavily reliant on rice production alone.
To demonstrate this vulnerability, take the findings of the Bangladesh
Agricultural Research Council who found that rice production could face a 10-33%
reduction at only a 2 degree Celsius temperature change 305. The council took into account
both the fertilization effects of higher levels of carbon in the atmosphere, as well as a
likely 60% moisture stress (drought)306. Taking the average crop reduction of this
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estimate of 21%, and applying it to the 2005 production level of 24,569,000307 tons, the
country would stand to lose $737,807,070 (5,159,490 x average price of
$143/ton308=$737,807,070) or 1% of its GDP resulting from reductions in rice production
alone.
Unfortunately, these calculations do not take into account the effects of increased
flooding that are also likely to occur due to climate change. During an average year, 2025% of the country will be inundated by river spills and drainage congestions 309; for
example extreme flooding in 1988 left 61% of the country inundated, caused US$ 1.2
billion in damage, and left more than 45 million homeless 310. The total monetary loss
caused by the 1998 flood amounted to 3% of the country‟s GDP 311 and the inundation for
an average year leads to the destruction of 500,000 tons of crops each year 312. Given a 2
degree temperature change, the peak discharge of the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Megna
Rivers will increase by 8.5%, -.5%, and 4.5%, respectively, leading to inundation causing
1.707 million tons of crops to be damaged 313. To put these changes in perspective, the
country would now be averaging crop losses above those incurred by the flooding of
1987, which saw 1.32 million tons of crops damaged. Given that 94% 314 of the country‟s
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crop production is rice, which fetches an average price per ton of $143315, the additional
cost to the economy for rice production alone will be $229,454,940, or .33% of GDP.
However, the damage to production is still not yet entirely accounted for. For
example, soil salinity negatively affects crop production due to BWE. At a baseline
scenario with no climate change, the crop reduction attributed to these effects is a loss of
196,398 tons of rice316. Taking the most conservative scenario put forth, rice production
is reduced by an additional 271,940 tons317 resulting in further losses of $38,823,070, or
.05% of GDP. Crop losses will also be associated with a .3M rise in sea level that will
inundate 5% of the country‟s land surface, 95% of which is agricultural318. This reduces
the country‟s production by 5%, leading to further losses to GDP that are now
$165,128,249, or .24% of GDP.
The total losses in rice production alone now stand at 1.62% of GDP, or nearly
half the devastation attributed to the floods of 1998. This is an understandably high
number due to the fact that rice production makes up 94%319 of total cereal production in
a country heavily reliant on agriculture. However, when it is compared to the direct
annual cost to the national economy of 0.5% -1% of GDP that natural disasters have had
on all sectors of the economy over the past 10 years, the potential macroeconomic shock
it could produce is staggering 320.
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The reduction in rice production will have economy-wide ramifications, including
a loss of jobs and income that will increase malnutrition levels as people are less able to
purchase foodstuffs at current prices, even as prices rise due to reductions in supply. The
potential impact on malnutrition rates for the under-five population is suggestive of the
overall impact that the climate could have on Bangladeshi society. For example, the
increase in cases of malnutrition at an emissions scenario of 550ppm has been estimated
at 16%321 for the South Asian Region. Taking this estimate and applying it to the 46%
(8,694,000 of a total under-five population of 18,900,000)322 of the under-five population
who were underweight in Bangladesh as of 2007, an increase of 16% in malnutrition
rates would cause it to jump by 7.4% to 53.4%. The additional cost of treating these
malnourished children with traditional interventions (breastfeeding promotion, child
survival programs, nutritional programs, and growth monitoring and counseling) that
average $20.24 per child323 would amount to .04% of GDP. Utilizing the same
methodology for the expected regional increase in diarrheal disease rates due to climate
change of 5.5% and applying it to Bangladesh, further costs can be calculated324. It
should be noted that this estimate does not include the effects of precipitation on diarrheal
disease as research has yet to quantify the amount attributable to flooding or drought.
However, a 5.5% increase in the 20% of the under-five population that would need
treatment at an estimated average cost per child of traditional interventions (breastfeeding
promotion, rotavirus immunization, cholera immunization, measles immunization, and
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the improvement of water supply and sanitation) of $34325 would cost the country .01%
of GDP.
When these costs are taken in tandem with those incurred by reductions in rice
yields, the country now faces annual costs equivalent to 1.67% of GDP. The central
government‟s annual revenue is equivalent to approximately 10.4% of GDP 326, of which
an average of 6% 327 is spent on all health expenditures. A rough estimate of the country‟s
annual budget according to these figures is $7,039,760,000, with annual health
expenditures of $422,385,600. With the increased costs due to climate change attributable
malnutrition and diarrheal disease amounting to $35,223,249 and reductions in national
revenue from crop losses lowering the annual health budget by 1.62%, 8.5% of the total
government health budget would have to be devoted to fighting the increases in these two
problems alone. This is simply not feasible as the country already lacks the ability to
adequately respond to present rates of malnutrition and diarrheal disease. The addition of
the incremental costs incurred due to climate change, combined with reductions in annual
revenue, render the ability of traditional public health sector interventions to manage the
scale of the problem highly doubtful.

325

Ebi, 5.
Bangladesh Growth and Export Competitiveness, 149.
327
“WHOSYS,” World Health Organization, www.whosys.who.int, 2008.
326

[- 96 -]

Table 5.1: Climate Change Impacts and Associated Costs
Impact

Cost as a % of
Health Budget

Malnutrition

Expected losses to
GDP
1%
($737,807,070)
.33%
($229,454,940)
.05%
($38,823,070)
.24%
($165,128,249)
.04%

Diarrheal Disease

.01%

1.8%

Total

1.67%

8.5%

Temperatures/Drought
Flooding
Soil Salinity
Sea Level Rise

Reduction in
National Budget
1%
.33%
.05%
.24%

6.7%

1.62%

Figure 5.5: Direct and indirect pathways for increases in diarrheal disease and
malnutrition due to climate change
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Bangladesh Socio-economic Context
The likelihood of large macroeconomic shocks clearly demonstrates the
vulnerability of the majority of Bangledeshi society. Much of this vulnerability is driven
by abject poverty that forces the use of water systems contaminated with raw sewage.
This contamination arises due to industrial waste, defecation practices, and unhygienic
disposal of human waste, leading to coliform counts of most surface water sources
unacceptable for domestic use. However, the reality of poverty renders its use necessary,
thereby exacerbating the high levels of diarrheal disease and increasing the under-five
mortality rate in Bangladesh328.
Poverty and vulnerability is however obscured by national economic data that
shows rising GDP and per capita income associated with a move away from heavy state
intervention in the economy following the early years of independence. The resulting
neo-liberal policies have created average annual GDP growth that was 4.65 % from 19911995, rising to 5.5 % from 1996-2000329. However, in spite of steadily increasing GDP,
over 80% of the population still lives on less than $2 a day330. The effect of this poverty
on the distribution of diarrheal disease within Bangladesh is evidenced by the relative
risk (RR) of dying from diarrheal disease for the lowest wealth quintile, which is 1.7
times that of the wealthiest quintile 331. The devastating effects of poverty are exacerbated
by a growth in inequality within society demonstrated by Gini coefficients for the same
time period that deteriorated from .388 in 1991/92 to .451 in 2000, with a pronounced
328
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effect in urban areas of .398 to .497332. In fact, rural areas, with 80% of the population,
contributed 78% of the total decrease in national poverty while the urban sector
contributed only 13%333. It is this rise in inequality, as well as the marked increase in
poverty in urban areas, that is driving socio-economic vulnerability to diarrheal disease.
Urban health problems have grown larger as, despite the overwhelmingly rural
nature of the country, urban centers have witnessed rapid growth. Urbanization began in
earnest in 1950 and picked up steam when the country declared independence in 1971 334.
During the 1950s, the country experienced an incredible 44.63% increase in urban
population as people migrated mainly to urban centers as a result of the British partition
of India335. This wave of urban migration was followed by industrial development that
pulled rural inhabitants from the countryside seeking a more stable existence. In recent
years (1991-2001), average annual urban growth rates have slowed to 3.15 %, however,
they are still double the overall rate of population growth336.
Today, 26% of Bangladeshis live in urban areas with an extremely high slum to
urban population of 85% 337. In fact despite falling growth rates in recent years, slums still
continue to grow at annual rates of 4%338. What is worse, while Bangladesh as a whole
has among the highest population densities in the world (2,600 persons per square mile),
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the population density in slums is roughly 200 times greater339. Vulnerability to diarrheal
disease is further aggravated by the fact that only 14% of slum dwellers have access to
improved sanitation compared to 44% for urban areas as a whole 340. These numbers
reflect not only the failure of development progress for the population as a whole, but the
very precarious state the majority of urban Bangladeshis find themselves in today.
In terms of food poverty and malnutrition, the poverty and inequality driving the
vulnerability of urban inhabitants have resulted in lower levels of caloric intake in
comparison with rural areas. Overall the country has seen a decrease of 4% of society
who have fallen below a threshold caloric intake (2,122 kilocalories per person on a daily
basis) from 58.35 million in 1983 to 56 million in 2005, which primarily took place in
rural areas341. Reductions in caloric intake are one factor that can lead to malnutrition that
has been shown to be extremely important for fighting diarrheal disease. However, taken
in conjunction with the fact that the main crop produced in Bangladesh is rice, which has
much lower nutritional content in comparison with other staple foods, it is not surprising
that malnutrition is such a large problem for the country.
The resulting impact of these factors on child mortality rates in urban areas is
striking. While high under-five mortality rates are endemic to both rural and urban areas,
the rate at which they are falling is very different. From 2000-2004, the rate in rural areas
fell by 14%, while the urban rate fell by only 4.5%342. In addition, neo-natal mortality has
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actually increased in urban areas by 5% 343 while rural areas have seen a simultaneous
decrease of 11%344, suggesting a distinct challenge faced by urban communities. While
some of this difference can be attributed to the work of Grameen Bank, BRAC, and other
NGOs that primarily focus on rural populations, inequality, poverty, and environmental
conditions within urban areas contribute heavily to these substantially different mortality
rates.
The situation in Dhaka is illustrative of the plight that urban inhabitants face in
Bangladesh. Inequality within the city has created a chasm between rich and poor as
household consumption rates of families in the richest quintile are five times that of the
poorest345. In terms of risk factors for diarrheal disease, high population density is
evidenced by the fact that 30% of the city‟s population share 80% of the total residential
area, while the remaining 70% share only 20% 346. High population density is aggravated
by the risky location of slums, which are primarily located in low lying areas near the
river due to the haphazard nature of unplanned urbanization. Nearly 7,600 households
live in slums located within 50 meters of the river and are at frequent risk of flooding347.
The situation is further worsened by the fact that nearly 60% of slums have poor or no
drainage348. As a result, during the 1998 flood 56% of greater Dhaka was submerged and
1.9 million people (30% of the population) were affected349. A survey of residents
completed following the flood showed that only 40% had recovered completely, with
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16% unable to recover at all due to loss of income, assets, and health 350. The major
impact this has on human health has not been addressed by the city‟s urban development
committee351.
The risk this flooding poses to increased diarrheal disease is compounded by a
lack of water and sanitation networks within the city. According to UN-HABITAT, only
44% of the overall population of Dhaka has access to “improved sanitation” 352. The
distribution of this meagerly allotted service is however highly skewed. In the poorest
quintile of the population, 9% of households have a sewage line, while 83% of the
wealthiest enjoy this service 353. This is due to the fact that only one sewage treatment
plant is in operation for the entire city, and it frequently experiences system failures 354.
The situation for the city‟s slum dwellers is even more bleak with only 2% of slums
having a public toilet within 100 meters355. In addition to these problems, access to fresh
water for hygienic purposes in the city is also limited. Currently 70% of households
under the poverty line use tube wells as their main water source due to a lack of piped
water356. However, high levels of ammonia in water supplies utilized by the Saidabad
Water Treatment Plant create significant barriers to delivering water supplies that meet
drinking quality standards for those areas that do enjoy piped water access.
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Figure 5.6

Source: UNEP, 2005
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In the case of sanitation, municipal wastewater collection and treatment are
already the most costly element of infrastructure required to meet MDGs for health, water
and environmental protection. Sewage treatment costs increase exponentially with the
degree of purification required, making it possible for the cost of wastewater treatment to
double357. For example, if climate change reduces stream flow by a certain percentage
say 30%, the pollutant load must be reduced by an equivalent 30%. This has significant
repercussions for health as surface water is of especially poor quality during the dry
season when lower water levels reduce the dilution of contaminants that breed disease358.
Despite the very real threat these urban conditions pose to health in the
developing world, migration to Bangladeshi cities continues. In fact, a “highly developed
migration process connects the rural southern districts of Bangladesh to Bangladeshi
cities”359. This process, however, is not a result of urban opportunity as only 60% of the
active workforce is employed360. It is perhaps more directly linked to the precarious state
many rural inhabitants find themselves in as the land available for agricultural use rapidly
diminishes in the countries rush towards urbanization361. In addition to this push factor,
environmental risks posed by flooding and drought have forced small landholders to
cover seasonal deficits by taking on expensive loans, which they are often unable to
repay362. As a result, a downward spiral of debt develops that leads in many cases to the
loss of the only productive asset rural inhabitants own; their land. 363 This process reflects
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the importance of push factors in rural to urban migration that Bangladesh, and all of
South Asia, encounters as a result of poverty, a lack of rural employment, and
environmental degradation364.
A major concern is the likelihood that climate change will increase this existing
migration as homes and land are lost to erosion and permanent inundation. The country‟s
2005 NAPA highlighted four categories of climate change impacts that will increase
migration: riverbank erosion, coastal erosion, permanent inundation and sea level rise.
The potential for increases in erosion, and thus displacement due to climate change, is
highly likely as the net increase in discharge for the GBM river system at a 2 degree
warming scenario is 12.5%365. The resulting riverbank erosion is already a serious
problem for urban communities, and is highly pronounced in slums. From 1982 to 1992,
over 1,060 kilometers of land eroded in the GBM river system; accretion resulted in the
addition of only 190 kilometers, leading to a net reduction of 870 kilometers that
displaced 350,000 people366. In addition, large population displacements are also
occurring along the coastline due to frequent and intense storm surges, sea level rise, and
coastal erosion367.
Currently 46% of the population in Bangladesh is found in the Low Elevation
Coastal Zone (LECZ), (defined as 0-10 meters above sea level) which is highly
susceptible to the above processes368. Moreover, the population in this zone grew at
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double the national growth rate from 1990-2000, and was most pronounced in urban
areas369. The vulnerability of this population is significant as it has been estimated that
climate change will lead to a 32% increase in the number of cyclones hitting land in the
Bay of Bengal. A 2 degree scenario will increase the intensity of these cyclones by 10%,
leading to average storm surge heights of 9.1 meters, a 1.7 meter increase from the
baseline370. To put this in perspective, the 1970 cyclone that caused 500,000 deaths
experienced storm surges between 6.1-9.14 meters, while the 1991 cyclone that caused
138,000 deaths, experienced storm surges between 6.1-7.62371. The corresponding
increase in inland penetration of enhanced storm surges has been estimated between 13
and 31%372. If the inland penetration of storm surge increases at the midpoint of this
estimate, 22%, then it is reasonable to assume that roughly 16,056,898 people in the
LECZ will be affected, or 10% of the population of the entire country.
In addition, at a 2 degree temperature change, migration is expected to increase
along existing routes anywhere from 5-10%373. This estimate is conservative in the case
of Bangladesh, due to the fact that coastal inhabitants will likely flee the devastating
effects of increasing storm surge at much higher rates. However, taking the midpoint of
this estimate (7.5%), and applying it to the 10% of the population that will experience
these increased climate events, an increase of 1,204,267 will likely be seen in urban
centers. Applying the slum to urban ratio of 85% to this population, a likely 1,023,626
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new slum inhabitants will lack access to water and sanitation infrastructure, health
services and education.
In addition to the migration caused by storm surge, a .3 meter sea level rise will
lead to a loss of 5% of coastal land, where one-fourth of the population (39,666,250)
currently resides374. Sea level rise therefore leads to a rough displacement figure of
1,983,312 or 1.2% of the total population. The resulting displacement due to sea level rise
and increased migration from coastal areas facing increased storm surge is now
3,187,579, or 2% of the entire population. If those displaced by sea level rise follow the
current rural/urban distribution of the country, 515,661 new urban migrants will join the
1,204,267 created by increased storm surge, resulting in 1,719,928 people, or a 4.2%
increase in urban inhabitants. The conservative nature of this estimate is further enhanced
by the fact that it does not take into account the effects of climate processes on long term
migration from agricultural areas outside of the coast. There is a high probability that the
actual increase in urban inhabitants will be much higher. Given the high rates of
urbanization that currently exist, as well as conditions that can only be described as
squalor that the majority of these inhabitants face, the challenge of responding to the
added stress of climate change-induced environmental migration is daunting.
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Bangladesh Institutional Context
The institutional context of the country is vital for mediating the macroeconomic
shock of a loss of 1.5755% of GDP, as well as increases in urban inhabitants of 4.2%.
Unfortunately, the government has not demonstrated the institutional capacity to
adequately respond to current levels of impact. This has been partially offset by the very
large presence of NGOs working within the country. However, their presence will not
serve to directly mediate the impact for those segments of society that are most
vulnerable to climate change, namely slum communities. This is largely due to the fact
that the focus of human development programs and essential health service packages,
have mostly targeted rural areas375. That is not to say that the strengthening of rural
livelihoods won‟t stem the tide of urban migration; however, the direct impacts of
diarrheal disease and malnutrition that will be felt in urban areas, necessitate an urban
focus.
The lack of infrastructure and services currently provided is linked to the
governments‟ ability to generate and spend tax revenue in appropriate ways that reduce
the population‟s vulnerability. In Bangladesh, this is severely hampered by high levels of
corruption that constrain economic development376. This underscores the vacuum that is
being created by a lack of effective governance.
Again the plight of poor residents in Dhaka serves to illustrate failures in
providing basic public infrastructure to citizens. In Dhaka, the municipal government is
unable to maintain public services due to budget constraints. This has resulted in
375
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inadequate waste collection that has forced 91% of slum dwellers to dispose of their
waste into low-lying lands, near railway tracks, drains, canals, or on the streets377.
In order to meet the massive level of demand for the provision of basic services
the government is unable to provide, local “entrepreneurs” known as Mastaans have
begun to illegally procure these services, offering them to slum inhabitants for
exorbitantly high prices. This system has arisen due to a lack of property rights where
slum settlements arise, leading the government, NGOs, and donors to deny service in
these areas. Mastaans then exploit the poor by leveraging patronage from local and
national political leaders, in the process becoming the only providers of service. The
resulting rates can be as high as 15 times the official rate, while water collection can take
up to 2 hours.378 The lack of water for hygienic purposes and long waits for inadequately
maintained latrines lead to poor hygiene that further contributes to morbidity and
mortality due to diarrheal disease 379.
Environmental conditions created by this situation are compounded by a lack of
awareness about the importance of hygiene in disease prevention. This is evidenced by
the inequality in access to education in the city. Currently, a meager 26% of poor
communities have a government school380, and only 40% of household heads among the
poor receive more than 5 years of schooling 381. NGOs have attempted to respond to the
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government‟s failure to provide for the poor by operating schools. Their efforts have
resulted in 76% of slum schools being run by NGOs382.
In addition, dropout rates for primary schools are substantially higher in urban
areas, primarily due to slum evictions and the need for income generated by child labor.
A recent survey of slum areas in Dhaka reported that on top of a lack of access to
schools, 58% of 6-7 year olds do not attend school due to a variety of poverty-related
factors, including a lack of income for tuition, and a migratory lifestyle 383. As of 2004,
the RR for diarrheal disease in individuals lacking a basic primary education was 1.25
that of those who did have education, and 1.67 that of those who had a secondary
education384. These risk levels have actually increased from 1.14 and 1.34 in 2000 385,
suggesting that a lack of education is magnifying the problem of diarrheal disease in
urban areas.
Access to healthcare is in much the same miserable state. Only 54% of the city‟s
households report access to health facilities, and only 7.3% of slums have access to a
public health clinic386. This is a result of the low levels of expenditure ($12 per person
per year387) that the government makes on health; in comparison, low-income countries
generally spend $21 per-person per-year388. The hospitals and clinics that do exist are
rarely located close to slum areas, resulting in extremely long wait times and limited
access. On top of these problems, supposedly free services often require substantial
382
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amounts of „speed money‟ to obtain care from a doctor, or medical supplies389. As a
result, only 12% of the urban poor obtain medical services from government service
centers390. Just as NGOs have stepped in to help fill the gaping hole left by the
government in education, they have also stepped in to provide health care. NGOs provide
20% of slums health clinic access, despite the fear of eviction and the resulting loss of
infrastructure391.
These inadequacies at the municipal level are compounded by the complex
administrative structure of the city. This structure includes a number of different local
and metropolitan authorities with various levels of overlapping responsibilities. The
confusion this situation causes, creates a lack of coordination between different national,
regional, and municipal government bodies in government planning and resource
allocation for urban management. The inadequacy of this structure is aggravated by
resources and power that are centralized in national level agencies, in spite of the
declared governmental policy of decentralized administrative and economic development
introduced in the 1980s392. The absence of a relatively equal distribution of resources and
power to lower levels of government has helped to further constrain local governments
throughout the country393.
Despite the large failures of urban governments such as Dhaka to provide their
citizenry with adequate levels of public goods, the country as a whole does show
examples of properly identifying and responding to urgent needs. Over the past 30 years,
389
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the national government has invested over $10 billion in flood management,
embankments, coastal polders and cyclone shelters capable of housing approximately 2
million people394.

Much of this activity has involved local communities located in

coastal areas most vulnerable to flooding and storm surge. In 2007, the cyclone shelters
built by the government, along with a community-based early warning system, limited
fatalities to a fraction of those lost to the 1991 cyclone395. This program demonstrates that
in spite of many of the failures of both municipal and national governments, the country
has the potential institutional capacity to respond to climatic changes.
This potential is, however, constrained in two vitally important areas: bi-lateral
cooperation with regional neighbors, and cooperation between national ministries. Many
of the regional problems over shared water supplies have arisen from bi-lateral
negotiations that have trumpeted nationalistic water development ideals at the cost of
regional cooperation and benefit. This is exemplified by India‟s implicit foreign policy of
bilateral agreements between riparian countries. This policy seeks to subvert smaller
countries attempts at forming a regional bloc as a counterweight to its domination of the
subcontinent. This has severely hampered regional cooperation, and led to significant
tensions between Bangladesh and India. These tensions are perhaps highest in relation to
the Farrakam Barrage. Despite these issues, India and Bangladesh did succeed in signing
the 1996 Ganges Water Treaty; a 25-year agreement over the dry season flows of the
Ganges River that includes a tentative agreement for future cooperation on augmentation
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of that flow396. However, agreements like this simply reinforce regional power inequities
and undermine the ability of less powerful nations to adapt to climate change.
The regional body tasked with cooperative action, the South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), has not been able to adequately respond to issues of
asymmetry and mistrust since its inception in 1985 397. The body has attempted to respond
to climate change by creating an action plan that seeks to bolster cooperation in many
areas, including adaptation and financing 398. This commitment was adopted by the Dhaka
Declaration, which further agreed to initiate, and implement, adaptation programs399.
In spite of recognizing the vital importance of environmental and poverty
linkages, the bloc has made very little progress in achieving tangible results on its many
proclamations400. The large doubts that regional actors have over the ability of this body
to facilitate cooperative efforts is likely to lead to unilateral actions taken to build
resiliency to climate change.

This will ultimately undermine the vulnerability of

Bangladesh, as it is at the mercy of these unilateral actions.
The other significant problem that the country faces is cooperation between
national ministries. It has, thus far, initiated a number of governmental activities aimed at
rectifying this situation, including the creation of a national climate change cell, national
climate change fund, and the NAPA process 401. While these are important steps, the
manner in which they have been undertaken poses potential problems. Originally, the
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NAPA process was undertaken by the Ministry of Environment, while the PRSP was
undertaken by the Ministry of Finance. While the country has taken steps to rectify this
situation, the recent introduction of the climate cell, which is meant to provide a
centralized focus for the government‟s climate change related work, is operating as a unit
of the Department of Environment. This cell is tasked with identifying climate change
impacts, and adequately preparing the nation through national development planning.
However, there is a very real likelihood of problems relating to funding, as it is isolated
from the ministry of finance.
A similar situation occurred on a global level when the United Nations
Environmental Program (UNEP) was created in Nairobi, Kenya. Originally, it was
designed to empower southern governments within the international community;
however, with the locus of funding, resources, and ultimately power, still residing in
Geneva, New York, and Washington, the organization was marginalized and suffered
from budget constrains many times larger than other United Nations programs 402.
The wisdom of the placement of the climate cell creates a high possibility of
similar problems. The national climate change strategy and action plan, espoused by the
Ministry of Environment, is estimated at $500 million for the first two years, with a total
program cost for five years of $5 billion, or 7% of GDP 403. In comparison to the $10
billion the country has spent over the past three decades on climate resiliency, adequate
funding is highly doubtful.
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The body has secured additional funding through its linkage to the international
negotiations of the UNFCCC. However, adaptation funds available under the GEF-LDCF
are dreadfully inadequate in comparison with the cost of this program as well as the
additional costs outlined in the previous sections. The country‟s ability to secure funding
through ODA is also doubtful as the international community has shied away from aid in
recent years. This is reflected in the amount of ODA the country has received declining
from $137,000,000 in 1997, to $57,000,000 in 2003404.
In the absence of outside sources of financing, the country‟s ability to generate
revenue for these programs is vital. Even assuming that problems related to cooperation
between agencies were resolved, the country would still face significant challenges in
raising the levels of resources needed from domestic taxation. In 2008-2009, over half the
country‟s budget (54.5%) was derived from tax revenue 405. This means that with an
annual budget of 10.4% of GDP, the contribution of tax revenue was $3,836,669,200.
The increased expenditures needed for diarrheal disease and malnutrition alone amount to
8.8% of this revenue.
Historically, like many other developing countries, Bangladesh relied on tariffs
and quantitative restrictions to raise revenue, which still account for roughly 40% of its
total tax revenue406. The possibility of raising this additional revenue from increased
import taxes is highly doubtful as import tariffs and average customs duties are slated to
decrease over the coming years407. Politically, it would be very difficult for the country to
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reverse this trend, due to its heavy reliance on the readymade garment export sector. The
bulk of trade conducted in this sector occurs primarily with the United States and the EU,
both of which hold economic leverage over Bangladesh 408. The possibility of raising this
revenue from income taxes is also doubtful as large scale macroeconomic shocks to
agricultural production will decrease demand for labor, and therefore income. The
situation poses a large dilemma for the country, as it attempts to fund the activities of the
climate change cell, as well as respond to increasing health threats from climate change.
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Chapter 6: Adaptation Policies
The 2 degree warming scenario outlined above has clearly demonstrated the
potential scale of challenges that climate change poses. Even given the conservative
nature of this warming scenario, the costs of climate change-attributable diarrheal disease
and malnutrition are 80% of the total government health budget. If these costs occurred in
isolation it is possible that policymakers could continue to respond in a manner similar to
that which has been traditionally advocated, including hygiene awareness, oral
rehydration therapy (ORT), breast feeding promotion and other cost effective
mechanisms for diarrheal reduction. However, given the multiple pathways through
which climate change will increase this disease burden, following this “band-aid”
approach will be, at best, an exercise in futility.
These interventions are simply unable to address the fundamental drivers of
vulnerability, including inequality and poverty that will continue to create conditions that
not only breed the disease, but breed vulnerability to the disease. While aspects of the
traditional approach are necessary, even integral components of adaptation policies for
diarrheal disease, their use alone isolates health interventions from broader problems in
society that significantly increase disease burden. Failing to acknowledge, and act upon,
these structural components of health, renders health interventions ineffective, as wider
policymaking efforts, and debates, have tremendous effects on health.
- 117 -

The 2 degree warming scenario demonstrates that it would be far more effective
for policymakers to decrease levels of societal vulnerability to diarrheal disease. This
proactive approach to disease prevention will also benefit society in a myriad of ways, as
the spillover effects of vulnerability reduction yield benefits to other sectors of society.
This reduction in societal vulnerability is a no-regrets solution that allows policymakers
to respond to the uncertainties of climate change scenarios and predictions by increasing
societal resilience, whatever level climate change impacts may be.
Figure 6.1

Targeted areas for adaptation policies in bold

1)Build Institutional Capacity
Planned adaptation policies begin with efforts at building institutional capacity.
Improved institutional capacity will allow the country to better manage the flow of scarce
resources so that it benefits those members of society most vulnerable to climate change.
In Bangladesh, this process has already begun with the completion of the NAPA, and the
- 118 -

Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan. The Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan
has thus far incorporated efforts at reducing societal vulnerability into the maintenance of
food security, social protection, and health. However, without strong efforts towards
fulfilling its sixth pillar, capacity building and institutional strengthening, the well
meaning intentions of this plan will not occur409.
Building institutional capacity has been a primary factor in the ability of lowincome countries, such as Costa Rica, China, Cuba, and Sri Lanka, to provide positive
health outcomes despite resource constraints. The WHO‟s commission on the social
determinants of health identified community participation in decision-making processes
relevant to health, and inter-sectoral linkages, as institutional factors that greatly aided in
these outcomes410. In addition to these general institutional components, the management
of water resources, regional cooperation, and the securing of international funding
sources, are vital for ensuring the success of adaptation activities.
In terms of inter-sectoral linkages, the capacity building efforts of the national
government must still address the isolation of the climate cell from the Ministry of
Finance. In order to empower adaptation efforts, the cell should be relocated to the
Ministry of Finance. This allows adaptation efforts to gain direct access to funding,
which is vital for the success of these efforts. This should be complimented by the
creation of individual climate cells in each of the national ministries. This will allow for
inter-sectoral linkages between the planning, and action, of ministries. This will reduce
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overlaps in resource expenditures, and allow ministries to identify cross-cutting measures
that address linked issues. This is especially important to adaptation strategies that must
be integrated with development strategies in national planning efforts and resource
allocation.
In relation to diarrheal disease, this will prove extremely helpful for the ministry
of health which receives a measly 6% of the annual budget. The increased levels of
expenditure needed to treat diarrheal disease and malnutrition alone demonstrate the need
for reductions in the drivers of these diseases. While the country must increase its level of
health expenditure - which is far below that of regional neighbors at similar levels of
economic development - it doesn‟t need to redirect vast amounts of resources to the
Ministry of Health in order to do so. It is far more sensible for the country to allocate
scarce resources to the broader drivers of health vulnerability through the inter-sectoral
linkages created by locating climate change cells in all government ministries.
For example, resources directed at adapting agriculture to climate change can
provide indirect benefits to health through decreased societal vulnerability to
malnutrition. This strategy is difficult to quantify in terms of benefits that directly aid
diarrheal disease, however, the spillover effects to a variety of societal problems are large
enough to warrant it. Indeed, without the concerted efforts of actors from a wide array of
sectors, many of the indirect pathways through which diarrheal disease and malnutrition
affect health simply cannot be adequately addressed.
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Build Capacity of Local Governments & Decentralize Power and Resources
Adaptation measures should be specific to particular locations and situations.
What may work in one location, with one socioeconomic group, may not be feasible in
another. Therefore, it is not possible for a national government to create a “one size fits
all” adaptation approach. It is imperative that national policy efforts improve the ability
of local communities to adapt to climate change. However, despite the necessity of
localized adaptations, national policy strategies are essential as adaptation measures are
unlikely to be implemented unless they are consistent with broader management
decisions embodied in national policies and institutions411.
It has been shown that efforts at decentralization actually exacerbate inequalities
at local levels; thereby increasing societal vulnerability if adequate levels of planning and
capacity building are not included. Bangladesh must build upon its network of climate
cells at the national level by creating a network of climate cells at local levels linked to
the central climate cell in the Ministry of Finance. This can be accomplished by building
upon existing disaster relief networks in coastal communities, as well as securing internet
and communications links that increase the flow of information from local to national
levels.
Chittagong provides an example from which the country can build in order to
successfully decentralizing responsibilities to lower levels of government. One of the
institutional mechanisms that enables the city‟s responsive capacity to natural disasters is
the standing orders for disaster management. These orders have been formulated by the

411

Smit & Pilifosova, 2003, 23-25

[- 121 -]

national government, and are designed to clarify roles and responsibilities at all levels of
government. This provides clear delineation of powers and duties to each level and can
help to mediate the confusion and competition between government agencies that Dhaka
experiences412. Adaptive capacity is much greater if social, cultural, and political
institutions ensure that the allocation of power, and access to resources, are distributed
equitably413. Empowering local governments through a more formal, and clear,
delineation of responsibilities allows this process to occur.
It is still unlikely that the national and local levels of government will be able to
address the deeply-rooted problems of poverty and inequality alone. In addition to efforts
in urban areas, the country must leverage the large number of NGOs active in rural areas
to help build capacity at local levels. The necessity of this cooperation is shown by the
achievements of civil society actors in reducing child malnutrition414. The government
must seek formalized arrangements with these actors to ensure that their efforts follow
national level policy and development efforts, coordinated through the national climate
cell. This will help the country avoid the duplication of efforts and resources, as well as
allow it to utilize these actors towards national development strategies.
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Improve Regional Cooperation Over Resources
The country should leverage these improvements in institutional capacity at a
national level to improve regional cooperation between Bangladesh and its riparian
neighbors. These efforts should be multilateral in order to reduce the destructive nature of
bilateral negotiations that India has sought in the past. Bangladesh should approach other
riparian nations in the hopes of signing a regional agreement that emphasizes holistic,
basin-wide management, rather than the management of resources within an individual
country‟s boundaries415. This is the only way to effectively manage a trans-boundary
resource that is vital to all parties involved, and is subjected to increasing levels of
stress416.
While it has not proven the most effective mechanism in the past, SAARC is the
best option for achieving regional cooperation, as the institutional framework has already
been laid. SAARC has shown a commitment to improving the wellbeing of children, the
environment, and poverty reduction, thus providing a strong framework for the
beginnings of a regional response to climate change. The importance of these three
interlinked issues in relation to diarrheal disease cannot be overstated, making the body a
potential platform for adaptation efforts. However, SAARC cannot be successful unless
bilateral relations among concerned countries are conducive to a multilateral process.
Therefore, Bangladesh must address the negative effect India‟s policy of bi-lateral
agreements is having on regional cooperation417.
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Utilizing SAARC is beneficial for a number of other reasons, including
knowledge sharing and communication. It has established regional centers for the
exchange of agricultural, migration, meteorological, health, and human resources related
information that will be vital for adaptation efforts, particularly in resource constrained
countries. In addition, the inclusion of civil society actors in the track II dialogues has
helped to facilitate collaborative research and advocacy undertaken jointly by academics,
social workers, journalists and others outside the governments of the bloc countries. The
inclusion of civil society actors in the SAARC process helps to make it more transparent
and accountable to the populations of all countries involved418.
Ultimately, these efforts are essential to reducing diarrheal disease, as reductions
in future dry season water supplies will magnify the spread of the disease. Without
adequate domestic water supplies for hygienic purposes, the gravity of the situation will
be greatly compounded. However, in addition to the importance of regional cooperation
to secure water supplies, cooperation will have numerous spillover effects for other
sectors vital to both adaptation, and national development. Despite what may seem a
policy stretch in relation to diarrheal disease, these efforts are essential for achieving
broader success in adaptation efforts.
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Improve Management of Domestic Water Resources
The country must also improve the use of water resources within national

boundaries in order to ensure adequate supplies for domestic use. This means Bangladesh
should improve efficiency in sectors that utilize the majority of the countries water
supplies, namely agriculture. There are many ways to do this at a national level, including
legislation that caps the allocation of water resources to agricultural users, and efforts
aimed at efficiency. Both of these policies should include measures that preclude
negative effects on the activity of this critical sector, such as the subsidizing of
appropriate technologies in order to ease transition.
Capping the allotment of water supplies to agricultural users, and reducing it by a
small percentage each year for as specified time period, would force agricultural users to
become more efficient. This would be beneficial to both industrial and domestic water
users. However, following this policy has the potential for exacerbating rural inequalities
by forcing small scale, and subsistence farmers into higher levels of debt and instability.
This policy, therefore, needs to be accompanied by government interventions that provide
subsidized technologies and social safety nets such as insurance schemes to ensure that
national policies do not harm the rural poor, or the productivity of the sector in general.
Ultimately, this policy will provide greater benefits than costs, as increases in
efficiency are desperately needed. Current levels of GDP production per cubic meter of
water used in the GBM basin are $3.47 compared with the world average of $8.6419. This
inefficiency is very costly for a poor country that relies so heavily directly, and indirectly,
419
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on this sector. Government adaptation efforts can increase efficiency through the use of
drip irrigation, the introduction of less water intensive crops, as well as other watersaving technologies420. Regional information networks maintained by SAARC can
greatly aid the country in determining the most appropriate technologies for achieving
increases in water efficiency.
In addition, the government should create and maintain laws that restructure water
use during the dry season. An obvious example are laws on water allocation that
prioritize different uses of water at different times, such as “summer water” and “surplus
flow”421. Organized drought restrictions are institutional mechanisms that can manage
variability by prioritizing different water uses during times of supply stress. These
measures should be accompanied by social safety nets like the subsidizing of water
delivery for poor areas during the dry season. The net effect of these measures will be a
more efficient use of water resources.

Secure Resources and Funding for Adaptation
Institutional capacity building will enable the country to secure additional sources
of funding, and revenue, for adaptation efforts. The costs outlined in the macroeconomic
analysis clearly demonstrate the fact that adaptation costs will require vast amounts of
long term adaptation funding to radically augment human and financial resources 422.
Domestic sources are woefully deficient for providing these additional resources. It is,
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therefore, critical that the country utilizes its institutional capacity to secure outside
sources of adaptation funding.
While the NAPA process has been heavily criticized on numerous fronts, it is an
important first step for the country in securing international sources of adaptation
funding. By beginning this process, the country now has institutional linkages to the
UNFCCC and the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). Annex II countries, like
Bangladesh, party to the UNFCCC can secure adaptation funding through the GEF,
which has $3 billion for climate change related activities. These funds are managed
through the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund, the Special Climate Change Fund, and the
LDC fund. Since 1991, $1.3 billion in grants have been allocated from the GEF trust fund
for climate change activities. While much of this investment has been targeted at
renewable energy and energy efficiency projects, the need to earmark funds for
adaptation purposes is becoming apparent 423.
In spite of the current lack of emphasis on adaptation, there are a number of
reasons why Bangladesh should continue its institutional linkages to the UNFCCC and
the GEF. Adaptation to diarrheal disease will require numerous efforts that align with the
principles of GEF adaptation funding. For example, the GEF funds macro level measures
that enhance adaptive capacity, as well as adaptations to natural climate variability that
do not need to be separated from the effects of climate change. Institutional capacity
building that enables the better management of dry and wet season water resources is,
therefore, qualified for this funding.
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institutional capacity building that enable the integration of adaptation goals into general
policy planning424.
In addition to these GEF requirements, a closer look at the requirements and
stipulations of the UNFCCC agreement shows a number of ways for Bangladesh to
secure funding. To begin with, Article 4.4 of the FCCC stipulates that Annex II parties
“shall also assist developing country parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse
effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects” 425.
Article 4.8 provides a list of “specific needs and concerns” that may qualify countries as
particularly vulnerable. One item from this list is the degree to which a country is prone
to natural disasters. Bangladesh is irrefutably prone to natural disasters, making this
stipulation of the agreement a leverage point for the country. Finally, both the SCC fund
and the adaptation fund are meant to finance improved monitoring of diseases affected by
climate change to improve institutional capacity. Ultimately, the ability of the country to
access these sources of funding depends upon maintaining institutional ties to these
processes, as well as following adaptation strategies aimed at building institutional
capacity and reducing societal vulnerability to climate change 426.
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Figure 6.2

Target areas for adaptation policies in bold

2)Diversify the Economy
The stability of the macroeconomic environment is a principal concern of
adaptation policymaking. Macroeconomic shocks produced by reductions in rice yields,
can severely affect the country‟s relatively undiversified economy, leading to several
outcomes that will aggravate diarrheal disease. In order to stabilize the macroeconomic
environment, the country must therefore diversify its economy to ensure that no single
sector, or crop, is overly responsible for the welfare of the country.

Reduce Reliance On Rice Production
Crop diversification allows for more nutritious staple crops to be grown,
providing reductions in malnutrition. The crops introduced must be water and saline
tolerant as both of these traits will help to create robust crops in the face of climatic
impacts. If the country were to diversify the $737,807,070 in losses that the midpoint
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(21%) of the climate change scenario predicted for rice production, to a crop that was
more climate resilient, significant savings can be achieved. For instance, if 10% of rice
production (24,569,000) were diversified to another crop that has an equivalent market
value, but that is sufficiently climate resilient so that it only faces reductions at the low
point of this estimate (10%), the potential monetary savings would be $38,647,037
($664,026,363 + $35,133,670=$699,160,033, $737,807,070-$699,160,033=$38,647,037).
This is equivalent to 138% of the increased malnutrition costs.
A similar methodology can be applied to rice losses due to flooding and salinity.
Assuming that 10% of rice production is diversified to a crop that only suffers half the
losses due to flooding that rice would, the potential savings are equal to $11,472,747, or
41% of malnutrition costs. For losses due to salinity the savings would be $1,880,021, or
6.71% of malnutrition costs. The total savings of a conservative 10% diversification are
185.71%. However, if the crops chosen were a more nutritious substitute, and crop
production increases decrease the cost of food, this policy would have even further
positive effects on reducing malnutrition.
Reducing reliance on rice production will also stabilize macroeconomic
conditions. Despite the fact that the crop is not destined for export markets, it can still
increase vulnerability to currency attacks and debt obligations. The growing debt the
country has incurred over recent years demonstrates the potential problem of debt
overhang. Reductions in a staple crop that constitutes 94% of total cereal production
would undoubtedly reverberate throughout the economy, as the other primary sectors are
still heavily reliant on stable agricultural production. Significant reductions in crop yields
would, therefore, create unstable macroeconomic conditions that can reduce the value of
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domestic currency, as well as the value of export revenue from the readymade garment
sector. Diversification of agricultural production, as well as the economy as a whole, is
therefore a policy necessity.
In addition to diversifying agricultural production, the country should diversify
other sectors of the economy that are reliant on agricultural products, as well as sources
of income427. The country can achieve development of sectors not linked to agriculture
through a strategy similar to that followed by the Highly Performing East Asian (HPAE)
nations. These nations - South Korea, Japan, China, and Taiwan -deliberately sought out
selective industrial policies that protected domestic manufacturing through tariffs,
subsidies, and export promotion, while actively exacting the maximum in technological
spillover effects from foreign direct investment 428. The maintenance of tariffs will be
especially important for their contribution to the incremental costs of adaptation and
climate change. The country should, therefore, revise the scheduled reduction in tariffs
that is currently underway.
Maximizing spillover effects from foreign direct investment is a particularly
useful strategy that China has employed to great benefit. Bangladesh should follow this
strategy and attract more foreign business partners to the readymade garment sector. It
could achieve this by designing special economic arrangements for a specified timeframe
in another city, perhaps Kulna, in order to reduce its reliance on production from Dhaka.
The government must be careful to stipulate in these arrangements that human,
technological, and financial resources are utilized to train the local workforce and create
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technology transfer. This will allow domestic actors to continue operations once the
contracts expire.
In order for this diversification to be successful, the national government must
play a large role in coordinating, planning and implementing, these activities through
climate cells in order to ensure that vulnerability is not increased by the promotion of
climate sensitive industries. This “big push” strategy will require improvements in
institutional capacity previously outlined, and should seek to promote education,
infrastructure, public investment, and technological improvements429. Additional funding
for this push can come from the GEF, which has specified economic diversification as
one of its target areas for adaptation.

Adaptation Forces
As a part of economic diversification, the country should simultaneously promote
Keynesian notions of full employment, aimed at implementing adaptation initiatives
throughout the country. These „adaptation forces‟ should be employed by local climate
cells that are funded by the national climate cell. They could be charged with carrying out
the activities mapped out by local climate cells in order to ensure locally appropriate
adaptations, while creating a formal mechanism for attracting international adaptation
funds.
For example, the country has already invested billions of dollars in disaster
preparedness and afforestation campaigns. The Community Based Adaptation to Climate
429
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Change through Afforestation program has already received $3 million from the GEF, or
1% of the $280 million it has distributed430. If the country can increase this funding to
2% of GEF adaptation funding, it could secure a further $5,600,000. This is equal to
1.3% of the total health budget. Moreover, the formal creation of these forces will help to
provide a labor intensive industry that will take advantage of the fact that almost half of
the population in Bangladesh is below fifteen years of age and unemployed 431.
An adaptation force can be trained in a variety of needed fields, including disaster
preparedness, agricultural adaptation, and most importantly for diarrheal disease, health
promotion. This population would then be considered a skilled labor force whose human
capital could enable institutional capacity building. This economic diversification stands
in stark contrast to traditional economic growth strategies that seek labor intensive
industries due to the low cost of labor, and the inability of workers to form unions.
In relation to diarrheal disease and malnutrition in urban areas, these forces can be
utilized to reduce drainage congestion and increase vegetation. The government is
already in the process of recovering drainage canals from development, which adaptation
forces should be employed to aid. This will reduce the severity of flooding events, thus
reducing fecal contamination and diarrheal disease. Important waterworks that adaptation
forces can provide are canals, tunnels and pipelines, which create water supply and offer
resiliency, as multiple sources enhance the security of water supplies432.
In addition to these activities, adaptation forces should be employed in “climate
proofing” national infrastructure, particularly water and sanitation networks in urban
430
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areas. In the face of uncertain sea level rise three options have been put forth: protection,
accommodation and retreat433. At a .3 meter sea level rise, protection and accommodation
are the most likely options. In Dhaka, for example, future construction projects will need
to be elevated in accordance with sea level rise predictions, while dikes will need to be
constructed, and existing structures raised and strengthened 434. The creation of
embankments will help obstruct the penetration of surge water and greatly reduce the
level of water that crests the embankments435. These activities must be extended to slum
areas in order to reduce their high vulnerability to flooding.
These forces can further reduce diarrheal disease by providing hygiene awareness
and health promotion activities in conjunction with NGOs. These measures reduce
diarrheal cases by up to 45%436, and have a profound effect on morbidity and mortality
rates. Fortunately, educational interventions and adaptations are also among the most
cost-effective measures for curbing morbidity and mortality related to diarrheal illness 437.
For example, hygiene education including hand washing with soap, costs a mere
$3.35/DALY saved, and can lead to a 43% reduction in morbidity, as well as a 48%
reduction in life-threatening cases438. In contrast, oral rehydration therapy costs over 300
times as much ($1,062/DALY) 439.
Cooperation between civil society and adaptation forces should also extend to the task
of allocating water supplies during the dry season to poor communities that lack water
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infrastructure. Dry season water supplies can be further augmented in slum areas by the
creation of community water storage techniques that capture and store rainfall. The
design and construction of these water storage mechanisms can be facilitated by
interactions between the national climate change cell, SAARC, and the UNFCCC in
order to identify appropriate low cost technologies. Once these have been identified,
adaptation forces, in conjunction with NGOs, can help create and deliver appropriate
storage mechanisms.
A final task for adaptation forces, and one of the most immediate and useful
adaptation strategies, is the protection and massive replanting of mangrove forests along
the breadth of the coastal belt 440. Replanting mangrove forests helps to reduce inundation
and vulnerability to flooding events441. In addition, it will provide poor communities with
a means of building social capital that is vital for adaptations and disaster preparedness.
This activity should be augmented by raising awareness about the dangers of natural
disasters, including those due to climate extremes, amongst coastal populations442.
Hygiene awareness and hand washing could also be integrated into such programs,
further increasing their effectiveness. The argument for this adaptation is all the more
resounding due to the ability of forests to sequester carbon dioxide.
Finally, creation of these forces will reduce inequality within society as members of
the adaptation force receive education and skills training that enable them to gain
employment both within, and outside of, the country. The potential for these forces to
provide adaptation services or other labor intensive services for developed countries is
440
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high, and could be utilized as an informal mechanism to boost household income through
remittances. The national climate cell could promote this skilled labor through the
UNFCCC and other international mechanisms, as well as through the international
connections of many large NGOs working in the country. The potential revenue
generated by this activity is large, as remittances have amounted to $30.4 billion over the
past 30 years and have been increasing by $3.8 billion annually443.
Ultimately, adaptation forces are merely a way for the country to employ its surplus
labor in the key tasks of adaptation. Due to a lack of economic opportunity, these forces
do not compete with other sectors for labor needs. Moreover, they are a communitybased mechanism that helps to build social capital and institutional capacity at local
levels.

Figure 6.3

Target areas for adaptation policies in bold
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3)Reduce Poverty and Inequality
In order to ensure the success of adaptation, socio-economic factors affecting the
country‟s ability to absorb or respond to changes in the natural system must be accounted
for444. Many of the problems arising from societal inequality have a demonstrable effect
on health. However health sector interventions generally do not extend to the structural
drivers of poor health, namely inequality and poverty. This has led many to trumpet the
cause of economic development to reduce these fundamental problems. Unfortunately,
many of the programs aimed at economic development have actually increased inequality
to striking levels. Ultimately, economic growth provides the opportunity to provide
resources for the health sector, but without appropriate social policies, it brings no benefit
to health outcomes445.
The importance of national policy in mediating the effects of growth, and
distributing them throughout society, is readily apparent in the very different health
outcomes that the United Kingdom and the United States experience in comparison to
Nordic countries. Nordic health improvements since the latter part of the 19th century
emphasized the importance of civil, political, and social rights, as well as a commitment
to universal health coverage, full employment, gender equity, and low levels of social
exclusion. The result of these policies was low levels of inequality in income distribution
and a telling absence of differences in living standards between socio-economic groups of
society446.
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In addition to this strong case for equality in reducing negative health outcomes,
reducing inequality is a cost effective adaptation for resource constrained countries 447.
Decreases in inequality that lead to reductions in the under five population suffering from
moderate and severe malnutrition which is currently 46% to a realistic 36% would
decrease the annual costs of treating malnutrition by $38,283,600. A similar decrease in
the 244,000448 under five deaths that occur every year would also lead to significant
savings. If the current 20% deaths due to diarrheal disease were reduced to 10%, the lives
of 24,400 children would be saved and the country would save $1,659,200 annually. The
total savings for these policies would be 13.5% of the total health budget. These
calculations are likely to be extremely conservative as only mortality is accounted for in
relation to diarrheal disease. In addition, disease burden reductions are taken in isolation
despite the fact that reductions in malnutrition would likely affect diarrheal rates and vice
versa. Therefore, it is essential that adaptation strategies address inequalities in health
outcomes that are direct results of systems that distribute power and resources at unequal
levels throughout society. These systems must be challenged, and ultimately restructured,
if the many complex pathways that affect diarrheal disease are to be addressed and
societal resilience increased 449.
This echoes the conclusion of the WHO‟s commission on the social determinants
of health. The commission found that the improvement of the daily conditions of life, and
the tackling of the inequitable distribution of power, money and resources that are the
structural drivers of those conditions of life, are the key principles needed in order to
447
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rectify social health inequities450. In slum areas these conditions have created horrific
living situations, as a result of their exclusion from basic public goods, a lack of
economic opportunity and income, high population density, and their location in relation
to natural disasters. For true adaptation to occur, Bangladesh must address inequalities at
all levels of society.
The diversification of the economy through the use of adaptation forces can begin
the process of vulnerability reduction. However, in order to sustain it, longer term goals
require increased investments in education, along with national policies that regulate the
accumulation of power and resources. This is not an argument for a centralized
communist state; merely, it is the logical acknowledgement that concentrations of power
and wealth tend to reinforce themselves at the expense of society as a whole451.
Therefore, economic development should be pursued, but with a socially-oriented
development policy, created by state institutions and marked by high levels of human
capital, which seek to harness the positive side of economic development and distribute it
more or less equally to all members of society. Polices such as these, which challenge the
causes of the mal-distribution of resources, will lead to poverty reduction and the
promotion of collective security; thereby reducing societal vulnerability to climate
change452.

450

CSDH, 26.
Todaro, 209-273.
452
Kelly & Adger, 332-348.
451

[- 139 -]

Education
The country‟s 2005 NAPA identified the mainstreaming of climate change
adaption into policies and programs in the health sector, as well as the inclusion of
climate change issues in the curricula at secondary and tertiary educational institutions 453.
The full cost of the two strategies was estimated at $1.5 million with the design phases
accounting for $50,000454. These two strategies were among the most cost effective of all
the strategies proposed by the NAPA team. They underscore the importance of education
and awareness in combating the deleterious effects of climate change on human health.
These policies should begin with holistic education efforts that include health
messages, such as hygiene education and nutrition awareness, but that also stress the
basic educational achievement of literacy. Recent studies in Dhaka suggest that
educational activities that focus on the promotion of hygienic environmental conditions
are desperately needed in combination with income generating opportunities, in order to
reduce the burden of child mortality455. The current adult literacy of 54%456 is simply
unacceptable, and greatly increases the burden of disease associate with diarrhea, as well
as societal inequality.
Educational efforts linked to adaptation must avoid the same pitfalls that vertical
programming of climate change efforts in national ministries faces. One of the most
serious pitfalls is the possibility of achievements in one sector being wiped out by failures
in another. If education does not provide a means for relieving poverty and inequality,
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then the positive effects of hygiene awareness and hand washing are nullified. Education
must therefore be provided on an equal basis to all urban and rural areas.
Educational efforts promoted by the government should also be linked to the work
of civil society actors in order to rectify rural/urban inequities. NGOs have done a
remarkable job in providing public services to rural areas, however urban areas have been
neglected. Government and civil society efforts must, therefore, be aligned in order to
rectify this imbalance. Improving efforts in slum areas would greatly reduce the burden
these populations bear from poor environmental conditions, a lack of health care
facilities, and a lack of general knowledge on the origin of sickness and proper treatment
methods457.
The current relative risk of under-five mortality for those with no education in
relation to those with secondary education is 1.667458. Educating slum and urban poor
populations regarding the cause of diarrheal disease as well as proper hygiene is therefore
a fundamental adaptation to climate change. Shastho Shebika is an example of an NGO
sponsored program that could utilize such interventions to immediately improve the
health of the urban poor. The BRAC sponsored program sends health volunteers door to
door in poor communities to treat and recognize ten of the most dangerous, and common,
diseases in Bangladesh459. While the volunteers provide a desperately needed service,
they receive no salary, earning income solely through the sale of essential health
commodities, such as drugs, contraceptives, birth delivery kits, iodized salt, hygienic
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soap, sanitary napkins and vegetable seeds460. With government or donor assistance
secured through climate change adaptation funding, programs such as these could
become entirely subsidized public goods provided to poor communities.
In addition to educational efforts that specifically target health promotion and
diarrheal disease, urban areas will benefit in the long-term from educational efforts that
build human capital, thus enabling a reduction in vulnerability by providing political
empowerment. Urban poor and slum communities must be empowered to participate in
decision making processes at local levels of government. Their exclusion is a large reason
they lack access to education, health services and water and sanitation networks in the
first place. Increased levels of education and awareness about these issues can provide a
means for them to effectively participate in lower levels of government and demand
property rights for informal settlements461. This, of course, is linked to institutional
capacity building and reductions in corruption, again demonstrating the need for a “big
push” strategy that enables many of these adaptations to occur simultaneously.
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Figure 6.4

Target areas for adaptation policies in bold

4)Reduce Problems Associated With Urbanization
Improve Urban Environments
One of the most direct influences that local governments have on vulnerability is
through their provision of water, sanitation, drainage, solid waste collection, and public
health improvement 462. The risk of diarrhea is greatly enhanced in the absence of these
efforts, as it heavily depends on improved environmental sanitation, hygienic practice
and medical treatment facilities463. An analysis of 144 studies showed that by improving
water quality and sanitation, child mortality fell by 55.5%464. Cost-effective adaptations
to these environmental health threats in Bangladesh can save as much as 3.5% of GDP 465.
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Adaptations focused on improving the allotment of these goods are therefore
necessary466.
Nearly all future vulnerability will result from the increasing occurrence of
climate related hazards already well known in Bangladesh, including floods, and
cyclones467. These events will likely have significant impacts on sewage and water
infrastructure that will lead to further fecal contamination. Cost-effective arguments are
difficult to make as infrastructure requires large sums of capital that provide future
benefits. Improving the existing sewage and drainage system in Dhaka alone is projected
to cost about $100 million468. However, the total economic cost of the poor management
of water resources in Dhaka is estimated at $670 million annually, including its impacts
on human health469. Therefore “climate proofing” infrastructure for the delivery of
sewage and water by funding improvements in current infrastructure, as well as providing
more stringent guidelines regarding the construction of future lines, is not only needed,
but cost-effective.
Improving urban environments is integrally linked to institutional capacity. In
well governed cities drainage structures that greatly reduce the severity of flood events
can easily be built into existing urban environments. In poorly governed cities where
urban planning and the enforcement of zoning laws does not occur, buildings and
infrastructure are often located in areas that disrupt drainage channels and increase the
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468 Patel et al., 2006, 32.
469 Patel et al., 2006, 32.

[- 144 -]

severity of flooding 470. The ability of local levels of government to provide these services
is hampered by a lack of financial resources and power. This is often exacerbated by
international donors and development banks that reinforce the power of national
governments by moving resources through a centralized national government 471. In order
to rectify this situation, local levels of government must be strengthened to improve the
provision of vital public goods by creating, and securing, channels that allow resources to
flow from national to local levels more effectively. The creation of climate cells at each
level of government will help to provide one level of resource and communication flow.
This, however, must be augmented with a formalized mechanism for communication and
resource transfer that can be greatly aided by internet and communications technologies.
Adequate resources allocated to local levels are only one side of the problem
faced by municipal governments. In Dhaka, interviews conducted by the World Bank
with donors, government agencies and NGOs revealed three major constraints to
providing public services to slum areas: a lack of government policy giving slum
residents rights and access, the eviction of slum residents, and the role of maastans in the
absence of formal government structures. These interviews reveal the fact that local
governments, bolstered by increased resources, must address the weaknesses of existing
urban planning efforts that create societal vulnerability. In many cases existing laws are
not enforced due to a lack of institutional capacity and oversight. Enforcing these
planning laws would restrict the further exploitation of slum communities by providing
them with property rights and formalized access to water and sanitation networks.
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However, in many urban areas, slum communities do not fall within municipal
boundaries. It is, therefore, critical to redraw these boundaries to include slum areas 472.
Issues regarding access are of paramount importance as the creation of
infrastructure will do nothing to reduce the under-five mortality rate if poor communities
cannot access its benefits. In order to ensure equitable access, local governments should
implement a policy of urban poverty reduction that provides the mandate for working in
slum areas473. This must be closely followed by the strengthening of the role of local
municipalities to deliver services474. In fact, by integrating this policy with the advocacy
of lower connection charges, and continued surveillance of drinking water, for only
$46/DALY dramatic improvements can be achieved475.
To help achieve this pro poor strategy, the country should engage multiple actors
to help provide services to low-income communities in urban and rural settings. Civil
society actors are the obvious target, however much of the vulnerability in urban areas is
created by private sector actors that operate without supervision from the government.
Therefore, public-private partnerships (PPPs) that help to create urban infrastructure in a
sustainable manner are vital to any adaptation strategy. These partnerships have
historically been accused of being antidemocratic and excluding already marginalized
urban groups476. This does not mean they should not be utilized, it merely means they
must be improved. It is not possible to address the structural drivers of negative health
outcomes without engaging the actors who are helping to create these outcomes. Again,
472 Patel et al., 2007, 56-62.
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the success of these partnerships depends greatly on the ability of poor groups to access
local levels of government and demand their rights. It also depends on the ability of local
levels of government to secure adequate resources and human capital to improve
regulation of municipal partnerships and activities.
An example of a current strategy that could be tailored to fit these policies is the
Dhaka governments‟ implementation of a pro-poor strategy for water and sanitation that
began operation in 2005. The program identifies extremely poor households based on a
set of eligibility criteria and provides a generous subsidy for the installation of water and
sanitation services. The program mandates that drinking water facilities provide 20 liters
per-capita per-day, and that the water source should be within 50 meters of households477.
Households are expected to contribute 50% of what non-poor households would
contribute to a government project of this magnitude, with a cap of Tk. 500 478. Despite
the good intentions of the program, there is a distinct lack of attention given to the urban
poor, as rural populations receive the majority of its benefits. Given the tremendous rates
of urbanization, along with climate change impacts specific to urban areas, programs
such as these desperately need to adapt, in order to assure equitable access to vulnerable
populations.

477 Patel et al., 2007, 58.
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Strengthen Rural Livelihoods
Recognition of the broader drivers of diarrheal disease necessitates a focus on
sustaining rural livelihoods, as well as improving urban areas. Urbanization in the
country is driven by rural poverty caused by an unsustainable rural economy that has
witnessed an extreme contraction in the rights of the majority of the peasantry 479.
Grameen Bank and BRAC have made laudable progress at improving rural livelihoods;
however, it has not helped to reduce migration to urban areas. Without concrete
achievements at stemming the rural push factors driving migration, the possibility of
climate induced drought driving higher levels of migration is very likely.
However, previous studies have highlighted the fact that migration still greatly
depends on the socio-economic status of those concerned. A study in Northern Ethiopia
found that people residing in marginal regions have developed a great variety of
adaptation mechanisms that strengthen their ability to respond to slow climatic changes
as well as extreme climatic events480. It is therefore important to compliment this ability
through adaptation efforts that improve land tenure rights, reduce concentrations of land
in rural areas, and provide insurance schemes for subsistence farmers negatively affected
by environmental or economic stresses.
Micro-finance institutions and international donors have focused much of their
efforts on the alleviation of poverty by allocating resources to labor abundant sectors and
activities. They have provided training and credit support for the landless in rural areas as
the impoverished nature of rural inhabitants is primarily due to limited access to land and
479 Mirza et al., 2005, 231-252.
480D. Kniveton, and K. Schmidt-Verkerk, et al., “Climate Change and Migration: Improving
Methodologies to Estimate Flows,” International Organization for Migration, 2008), 33-34.
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agricultural technology. While income generation is important, the primary focus of rural
adaptation efforts should be restructuring of land tenure rights and access. This will help
to reduce concentrations of land and resulting inequalities in income and health.
Providing the rural poor with better access to land is a difficult task that requires
basic educational initiatives in order to increase literacy, as well as educational initiatives
that empower the poor to participate in political processes. As levels of educational
attainment are very low in rural Bangladesh, the countries climate cell should establish a
primary level educational curriculum that not only educates the rural poor on the dangers
of climate change, but empowers them through literacy training and awareness-raising on
their ability to participate in local levels of political decision making.
In addition to these efforts, the country must introduce a comprehensive rural
insurance scheme that covers the poor in case of crop failures. As migration has been
shown to be linked to the need to cover debt obligations incurred in the dry season due to
reductions in crop yields, such a scheme will help mitigate urban migration. Insurance
schemes have been mentioned by numerous authors in relation to climate change and
should be an integral component of climate change adaptation for the country.
Knowledge and enrollment of the schemes should be linked to primary level education
activities in order to maximize coverage.
Both of these activities must be undertaken in partnership with civil society actors
who have proven to be very effective in reducing poverty in rural areas. In particular,
Grameen bank would be an important partner as it already has an educational program
that promotes 16 principles that are integrally linked to the promotion of health. The bank
already benefits from a special relationship with the government that allows it to operate
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as a nonprofit organization, despite the fact that for all intents and purposes it is a bank. It
is, therefore, a prime candidate for partnership efforts. By partnering with the bank, the
national climate cell can more effectively and efficiently reach the rural poor through the
community groups the bank has already formed for lending purposes481. Ultimately, these
partnerships will enable the resource constrained government to carry out adaptation
activities that would be impossible without the aid of civil society.
Figure 6.5

Target areas for adaptation policies in bold

Table 6.1: Selected Adaptation Policy Savings
Impact

% savings of
Malnutrition costs

% savings of
Health Budget

Rice Production
Diversification
Reductions in
Inequality
Secured
International
Funding
Total

185.71%

12.5%

136%

13.5%

23.5%

1.3%

79.22%

27.3%

102.27%

321.71%

481 Grameen Bank, www.grameen-info.org.
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% savings of
Diarrheal Disease
costs

Chapter 7: Conclusion
Bangladesh vividly demonstrates that vulnerability to climate change arises from
a complex web of biophysical, social, and economic forces 482. Access to water and
sanitation, health care, and education, all hallmarks of development efforts, can help costeffectively mitigate these forces, and provide demonstrable benefits to the population.
However, despite the potential benefits these public goods can provide, traditionally
advocated public health interventions do not have the ability to respond to the coming
storm. In order to respond to the magnitude of climatic impacts, adaptation policies have
been advocated on the principle that reducing societal vulnerability to climate change is
the most effective adaptation response to climate change. This offers Bangladesh a noregrets solution, as even in the absence of climate change impacts these policy proposals
yield substantial benefits to society.
Traditional health interventions based on cost-effective criteria may be beneficial
in the short-term; however, such actions undermine sustainable achievements if economic
rationales that focus on short-term cost-efficiency are not eventually revised. Moreover,
the long-term destructive nature of industrial activity presently dictated by economic
expansionism helps to create the overwhelmingly poverty experienced by the developing
world. In the long run, the short-sightedness of this economic paradigm will destroy the
482 Bangladesh NAPA, Ministry of Environment and Forests, 8-18.
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basis of human health and well-being in slum, and urban elite populations. The necessary
investments for adaptive and sustainable future outcomes simply do not equate with this
world view.
While it is very easy to make moral decrees on the equity of human life, there can
be very real barriers to implementing this equity. A lack of resources has left many
countries in the unenviable position of using cost-effectiveness as criteria for saving and
improving lives. However, social and economic forces that create inequality are the result
of a set of interactions created by society that define class structures and income levels. It
is these factors that have been viewed throughout history as immutable, and yet provide
perhaps the most effective means of adaptation for low-income countries such as
Bangladesh.
Social, political, and economic equality resulting from structural changes and
mandated policies, can be viewed as perhaps the most effective low-cost solution. It
strictly monetary terms, altering the social and political interaction between humans that
creates poverty, morbidity and mortality can cost nothing. However, it is very costly in
terms of social and political organization that will be needed to overcome powerful
entrenched interests that block meaningful systemic reform. Ultimately, adaptations that
are realistic and cost-effective almost to a fault, are ineffective as structural problems of
inequality and poverty persist and worsen. Only solutions that reflect the wisdom of
committed and sustained systematic reform that creates equality within, and between,
nations will render the global community as strong as its weakest link. Adaptation policy
does not therefore require moral indignation, but a pragmatic understanding of reality.
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Convincing policymakers of the wisdom of this pragmatism is difficult as
societies tend to be reactive. Nowhere is this more obvious than the gulf between talk and
action in mitigation as evidenced by the many scathing critiques of the Kyoto approach.
However, in the case of adaptation, inaction is more aptly described as a yawning chasm.
As policymakers begin to face the harsh reality of impending climate change,
implementation becomes the challenge facing adaptation. It can not wait as politicians,
business interests, and lawyers iron out the details of complex international treaties that
avoid the underlying causes of the crisis.
What is more dramatic and disconcerting is the institutional inertia present in the
developed world, which is largely responsible for the emissions and lifestyle that has
created the crisis. If the focus of mitigation and adaptation efforts remains centered on
proximate rather than underlying causes, even the best-case scenarios for implementation
of adaptation efforts in undeveloped countries will prove ineffective as extreme scenarios
become reality. Adaptation required for these scenarios requires a level of courage that no
nation on earth has shown the courage to implement.
Sadly, the ability of humanity to adapt is highly questionable. The underlying
state of environmental degradation outside the realm of climate change, largely ignored
in the policies and programs implemented by nations around the world, is a direct result
of the increasing gap between humanity‟s development and the wisdom needed to
properly guide that development. This gap is what simultaneously drives human relations
that leave the bulk of humanity struggling to survive on less than $1 a day. Morally this is
reprehensible, however in pragmatic terms of the continued existence of a society or
civilization, it is ignorant and shortsighted to a degree that is inconceivable. Effective
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adaptation, as with all policies, requires a wisdom which humanity has not yet proven
itself capable of wielding.
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